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Thesis: In upholding the constitutionality of capital punishment, the United States Supreme 
Court has utilized a strict construction interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause, which has led the opponents of capital punishment to abandon the Due Process 
approach and look to the Eighth Amendment, for which the justices utilize a loose construction 
interpretation. 
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“Most people approve of capital punishment, but most people would not do the 
hangman’s job.”1 Although capital punishment has been a constitutionally recognized practice 
since America’s colonial history, there is still great controversy that surrounds the tradition.2   
The Supreme Court of the United States (the Court), has often upheld the constitutionality of 
capital punishment through its interpretation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.3  
However, the methods of constitutional interpretation have varied throughout the court’s history, 
thus altering the constitutionality of aspects of capital punishment.4 The methods of interpretation 
utilized by the Court can broadly be categorized as strict and loose constructionist, and 
encompass several specific views regarding the Constitution and its amendments.5 Interpretations 
of constitutionality come in trends and depend on the particular Justices reviewing a case. For 
example, in 1972 the Court ruled that capital punishment violated the Eighth Amendment, then 
reinstated the practice in 1976.6 Therefore, in upholding the constitutionality of capital 
punishment, the United States Supreme Court has utilized a strict construction interpretation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which has led the opponents of capital 
punishment to abandon the Due Process Approach and look to the Eighth Amendment, for which 
the justices utilize a loose construction interpretation. 
The famous case, Marbury v. Madison, heard by Chief Justice John Marshall’s Supreme 
Court in 1803, established the principle of judicial review, which provided the Court the power 
to declare an act of the United States government unconstitutional and therefore null and void.7   
It was Marshall’s passionate belief that the federal judiciary must have the power of judicial 
review. Delivering the opinion of his 19th century Court Chief Justice Marshall wrote,  
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the 
law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound 
and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide 
on the operation of each (Marbury v. Madison 1803, emphasis his). 
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Marshall held that the Constitution was superior to any ordinary act of the legislature and 
therefore must govern any case to which both apply. In his ruling, Marshall applied a strict 
construction interpretation of the Constitution; he wanted to demonstrate that judicial review is a 
“logical extension of the Court’s exercise of judicial power, that is, the power to decide cases” as 
exemplified in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution (Ducat 5. See Appendix B). 
Regarding constitutional interpretation, authors Sotirios Barber and James E. Fleming 
hold, “Interpreting the American Constitution is a cognitive activity that takes place in a specific 
kind of context and proceeds from specific assumptions. The context is one of disagreement 
about whether an act of government is either permitted or required by some provision or 
associated principle of the Constitution. The assumptions at work in this context are; (1) that the 
Constitution, faithfully followed, would limit what the government may do; (2) that those limits 
can be known with reasonable confidence; (3) that reasonable persons would regard those limits 
in general as serving a paramount good” (Barber 13).  Paramount good may be understood either 
from the perspective of the Founding Fathers, whose aim was the protection of  natural rights, or 
more progressive thinkers who viewed paramount good as social progress. The Constitution not 
only limits what government may do, but also permits the government certain actions. Whether a 
strict or loose interpretation is applied, the ultimate aim of constitutional interpretation is to make 
sense of what the Constitution says—seeing  for ourselves why anyone would voluntarily adopt 
the Constitution as supreme law.8 
Strict construction interpretation is a broad term for the traditional approach to 
constitutional interpretation. It encompasses a more literal or narrow reading of constitutional 
provisions, which may either permit or limit government actions. A strict construction 
interpretation of the Constitution may protect state rights when those rights are at risk of being 
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usurped by the federal government (McClellan). However, words can have many different 
meanings which could change the entire context of a section or even the whole document itself. 
Textualism, Originalism, and Structuralism are three common forms of strict construction.9 
 Textualism finds constitutional meaning by consulting the plain words of the 
constitutional document. A famous example of the textualist approach to constitutional 
interpretation is Justice Hugo Black’s view of the Ninth Amendment applied to Griswold v. 
Connecticut (1965), where he held that that the only constitutional rights are those enumerated in 
the text.10 In the same manner, Originalism, also referred to as “Original Meaning,” looks to the 
original public meaning of the words of the constitutional document, what they meant in 1791. 
“Original Intent” is another aspect of Originalism, but is not part of the focus of this essay.11 
Lastly, Structuralism looks to the overall constitutional arrangement of offices, powers, and 
relationships—“the meaning of the Constitution as a whole” (Barber 117). The leading structural 
principles include federalism, separation of powers, and democracy.12 
In contrast to strict construction, loose construction and it specific approaches hold a very 
different view of constitutional interpretation. Loose construction allows the meaning of the text 
of the Constitution to change over time. Former Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan 
wrote, “The function of the Supreme Court justice is to interpret the Constitution in such a way 
as to resolve the predominant social, economic, philosophical, and political questions of the day-
which are often issues on which contemporary society is most deeply divided” (Stolyarov II).  
Loose construction uses the Necessary and Proper Clause and the General Welfare Clause of the 
Constitution in its determination of constitutionality. The Constitution is interpreted as 
authorizing congressional laws for any activity or purpose not explicitly forbidden to the federal 
government (Purvis).13  
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Common classifications of loose construction are the Philosophic Approach,14 
Doctrinalism, and Consensualism. These approaches all allow the meaning of constitutional 
provisions to change according to contemporary standards.  The Philosophic Approach 
represents a fusion of constitutional and moral philosophy, how we ought to interpret the words 
of the Constitution to approximate their true meaning in a contemporary context.15 Accordingly, 
constitutional law has involved controversial philosophic choices throughout American history 
(Barber 164). Doctrinalism, however, looks to constitutional provisions through layers of 
interpretations in previous cases rather than directly. These past interpretations purport to 
articulate constitutional principles in the form of rule or precedents that bind future courts 
(Barber 135).16 It is difficult in constitutional law to decide why an old case should be a 
precedent for future cases.17 However, it must be recognized that American constitutional 
practice does include a limited policy of stare decisis, 18 which makes old cases important, 
though not totally conclusive in judicial determinations of constitutional meaning. This can 
involve evolving meanings through changes from case to case.  Consensualism consults a current 
social consensus on what the words of the Constitution mean, which can change and evolve over 
time. 19 
The methods of constitutional interpretation are essential to understand capital 
punishment and why its constitutionality has been upheld by the Court. Capital punishment has 
been an established practice in the United States since the country’s colonial history, adopted 
from English custom. The “bloody” codes of England’s criminal code, which listed hundreds of 
capital crimes, were modified to suit local colonial needs (Oshinsky 5). For example, in 
Massachusetts, where religion played a significant role in settlement, capital offenses included 
crimes such as blasphemy, witchcraft, and adultery.20 The death penalty’s legitimacy rested on 
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three well defined principles: deterrence, penitence, and retribution (Oshinsky 5). Capital 
punishment was popular during colonial times because it, “fulfilled the moral expectations of 
colonial Americans most of the time, and that was enough to make it the standard penalty for all 
serious crimes. Hardly anyone suggested that it be used more sparingly, much less that it be 
abandoned.”21 The death penalty was seen as essential to preserving the moral and social order 
throughout the colonies (Oshinsky). In post-revolutionary America the power to impose the 
death penalty was left to the individual states.22  
The Founding Fathers had made it explicitly clear that executions excluding torture did 
not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment” 
(Oshinsky 7). The Fifth Amendment, adopted on the same day as the Eighth, prescribes that a 
person cannot “be twice put in jeopardy of life” for the same offenses, nor “be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of the law.”23 This presents the clear implication that a 
person can be executed if due process is provided. Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment has 
been used by the Court as a legal mechanism in its determination of the constitutionality of state 
capital punishment. The Fourteenth Amendment permits capital punishment and allows the 
federal government to regulate and review execution laws. The federal government may 
intervene when there is an absence of due process. The Incorporation Doctrine applies the Eighth 
Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment which allows the federal 
government to intervene in capital punishment if there is due process but the prescribed 
execution method is cruel and unusual; this is not disputed.24 
The Court applied the Due Process Approach when it reviewed Furman v. Georgia in 
1972 and Gregg v. Georgia in 1976. In Furman the majority held that the imposition and 
carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constituted cruel and unusual punishment in 
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violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Georgia capital punishment laws violated 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because they allowed death to be imposed in an 
“arbitrary” and “capricious” manner. The court was profoundly divided on this issue presented in 
the case, thus the opinion was per curiam.25 Chief Justice Blackmun wrote, “Although the Eighth 
Amendment literally reads as prohibiting only those punishments that are both ‘cruel’ and 
‘unusual,’ history compels the conclusion that the Constitution prohibits all punishments of 
extreme and barbarous cruelty, regardless of how frequently or infrequently imposed” (Furman). 
Since the Court determined that Georgia’s capital punishment laws had been unjustly applied, 
the government had the right to intervene through the Fourteenth Amendment power to review 
state procedure. 
However, in Gregg v. Georgia (1976), the Court upheld Georgia’s new capital-
sentencing procedures, concluding that they had sufficiently reduced the problem of arbitrary 
and capricious imposition of death associated with earlier statutes. The new laws provided for 
bifurcated proceedings, one to determine guilt and one to determine whether to execute. Justice 
Stewart, delivering the opinion of the court, wrote: “We now hold that the punishment of death 
does not invariably violate the Constitution” (Gregg). The constitutionality of the sentence of 
death itself was not at issue, and the criterion used to evaluate the mode of execution was its 
similarity to “torture” and other “barbarous” methods.26 The majority held that “evolving 
standards of decency” require focus not on the essence of the death penalty itself but primarily 
upon the procedures employed by the State to single out persons to suffer the penalty of death.27 
The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process approach was once more applicable because the Court 
again focused on the procedural aspects of capital punishment.28 
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McClesky v. Kempp, heard in1987, illustrates one of the last major attempts by opponents 
of capital punishment to restrict the death penalty through the Due Process Approach. The Court 
reviewed a challenge to death penalty laws based on a study that showed murderers of white 
victims were far more likely to be sentenced to death than murderers of black victims.29 
McClesky argued that the Baldus study demonstrates that the Georgia capital sentencing system 
violates the Eighth Amendment. Justice Powell wrote, “This case presents the question whether a 
complex statistical study that indicates a risk that racial considerations enter into capital 
sentencing determinations proves that petitioner McClesky’s capital sentence is unconstitutional 
under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment.” The majority wrote, “In light of our precedents 
under the Eighth Amendment, McClesky cannot argue successfully that his sentence is 
“disproportionate to the crime in the traditional sense” (McClesky). 
McClesky did not deny that he committed a murder in the course of a planned robbery, a 
crime for which this Court has determined that the death penalty constitutionally may be 
imposed.30 His disproportionality claim “is of a different sort”31  because McClesky argued that 
the sentence in his case is disproportionate to the sentences in other murder cases. Nevertheless, 
the Court held that because McClesky’s sentence was imposed under Georgia sentencing 
procedures that focus discretion “on the particularized nature of the crime and the particularized 
characteristics of the individual defendant,” they may lawfully may presume that McClesky’s 
death sentence was not “wantonly and freakishly” imposed (McClesky). Accordingly, the 
sentence is not disproportionate within any recognized meaning under the Eighth Amendment. 
Similarly, the Court stated that there was no evidence that the Georgia Legislature enacted the 
capital punishment statute to further a racially discriminatory purpose, and McClesky failed to 
demonstrate that “the legislature maintains the capital punishment statute because of the racially 
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disproportionate impact suggested by the Baldus study” (McCleksy).  Therefore, McClesky’s due 
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were not violated. Although there have been 
more recent cases that have partly used the Due Process Approach, their scope has been very 
narrow and apply only in a small number of death penalty cases.32 As it stands, McClesky has 
been the last major attempt at restricting capital punishment through the Due Process Clause.  
Post-McClesky, death penalty opponents began to rely on the Court’s more loose 
construction interpretation of the Eighth Amendment in an attempt to restrict capital punishment. 
In 2002 the Court reviewed Atkins v. Virginia, considering whether capital punishment is 
unconstitutional when applied to the mentally retarded, and if punishment is excessive judged by 
the standards that currently prevail.33 Construing and applying the Eighth Amendment in light of 
society’s developing standards, the Court concluded that such punishment is excessive and that 
the Constitution “places a substantive restriction on the State's power to take the life” of a 
mentally retarded offender (Atkins). The majority also held, “The basic concept underlying the 
Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. . .  The Amendment must draw its 
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” 
(Atkins).34 Using a more loose construction approach the majority relied on interpreting the 
Eighth Amendment according to contemporary standards of what constitutes “cruel and unusual” 
punishment. 
The Atkins dissent, consisting of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, 
held to a more strict construction interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. The justices embraced 
the opinion that the question presented by this case is whether a national consensus deprives 
Virginia of the constitutional power to impose the death penalty on capital murder defendants 
like the petitioner. Writing separately, Chief Justice Rehnquist called attention to the “defects” in 
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the Court's decision to place weight on foreign laws, the views of professional and religious 
organizations, and opinion polls in reaching its conclusion (Atkins).35  According to Rehnquist, 
making determinations about whether a punishment is “cruel and unusual” under the evolving 
standards of decency embraced by the Eighth Amendment, the Court has emphasized that 
legislation is the “clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values” (Atkins). 
In effect, Rehnquist does recognize that there are evolving standards of decency and these allow 
for the meaning of what is cruel and unusual to change over time. However, unlike the majority, 
Rehnquist holds that it is the province of the legislator—federal and state—to determine the 
meaning.36 Further, the work product of legislatures and sentencing jury determinations—ought 
to be the sole indicators by which courts ascertain the contemporary American conceptions of 
decency for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.37 
Capital punishment was further restricted in 2005 when the Court reviewed the case 
Roper v. Simmons. Reconsidering the decision made in Stanford v. Kentucky (1989),38 the Court 
determined that the death penalty could not be applied to persons under the age of 18 at the time 
they committed their crime. Utilizing a more loose construction interpretation once more the 
majority argued that the Eighth Amendment’s provision against “cruel and unusual punishment” 
is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporation Doctrine. Relying on 
the Court’s decision in Atkins, the majority further held that the Eighth Amendment guarantees 
individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions. The right flows from the basic 
“precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] 
offense” (Roper). Their opinion stated, “A majority of States have rejected the imposition of the 
death penalty on juvenile offenders under 18, and we now hold this is required by the Eighth 
Amendment” (Roper).39 The Court’s determination that the death penalty is disproportionate 
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punishment for offenders under 18 “finds confirmation in the stark reality that the United States 
is the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death 
penalty” (Roper). Though the majority utilized foreign law in their decision, this utilization was 
not required, loose construction interpretation allows the court to use foreign law. It was the 
Court’s belief that this reality does not become controlling, for the task of interpreting the Eighth 
Amendment remains the responsibility of the Court.  
Dissenting Justice O’Connor argued that, “The Court’s decision today establishes a 
categorical rule forbidding the execution of any offender for any crime committed before his 18th  
birthday, no matter how deliberate, wanton, or cruel the offense. Neither the objective evidence 
of contemporary societal values, nor the Court’s moral proportionality analysis, nor the two in 
tandem suffice to justify this ruling” (Roper). Although the Court found support for its decision 
in the fact that a majority of the States now disallow capital punishment of 17-year-old offenders, 
it refrained from asserting that its holding is compelled by a genuine “national consensus” 
(Roper).40 O’Connor did agree with much of the Court’s description of the general principles that 
guide Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. The Amendment bars not only punishments that are 
inherently “barbaric,” but also those that are “excessive” in relation to the crime committed.”41 
However, O’Connor did not agree that capital punishment is a disproportionate penalty for 
juvenile offenders.42 
Likewise, Justice Scalia along with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas argued 
for a more strict construction interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. Scalia vehemently wrote, 
“What a mockery today’s opinion makes of Hamilton’s expectation, announcing the Court’s 
conclusion that the meaning of our Constitution has changed over the past 15 years — not, mind 
you, that this Court’s decision 15 years ago was wrong, but that the Constitution has changed. 
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The Court reaches this implausible result by purporting to advert, not to the original meaning of 
the Eighth Amendment, but to ‘the evolving standards of decency’ of our national society” 
(Roper, emphasis his).43 The majority claimed an impossible assertion when it argued for a 
“national consensus” that affects the modern “standards of decency” and in effect the Court 
“throws overboard a proposition well established in our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence” 
(Roper). Further, it was Scalia’s opinion that judges are “ill equipped” to make legislative 
judgments as the majority attempted in this cases (Roper).44 
More recently, in Baze v. Rees (2008) the Court ruled that Kentucky’s lethal injection 
procedure is consistent with the Eighth Amendment and does not violate the ban against “cruel 
and unusual” punishment. The Court affirmed the Kentucky Supreme Court’s ruling that a 
method of execution violates the Eighth Amendment only when it “creates a substantial risk of 
wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, torture or lingering death” (Baze). It was held that 
lethal injection does not create such a risk.45 Continuing, the Court wrote, “Kentucky’s decision 
to adhere to its protocol despite asserted risks, while adopting safeguards to protect against them, 
cannot be viewed as probative of the wanton infliction of pain under the Eighth Amendment” 
(Baze).46  Kentucky’s lethal injection procedure was upheld because it provides sufficient 
safeguards that makes it one of the most humane forms of capital punishment, and therefore 
constitutional. 
Dissenting Justice Ginsburg joined by Justice Souter, disputed the constitutionality of 
Kentucky’s protocol. They stated, “Kentucky’s protocol lacks basic safeguards used by other 
States to confirm that an inmate is unconscious before injection of the second and third drugs. I 
would vacate and remand with instructions to consider whether Kentucky's omission of those 
safe-guards poses an untoward, readily avoidable risk of inflicting severe and unnecessary pain” 
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(Baze).47 Currently, no clear standard for determining the constitutionality of a method of 
execution emerges from prior decisions. This is so because the Eighth Amendment “must draw 
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society” (Atkins). Whatever little light prior method-of-execution cases might shed is “thus 
dimmed by the passage of time” (Baze).48  
There is a general consensus in the Court that capital punishment in and of itself is not 
cruel and unusual, and its opponents have been unable to use the Eighth Amendment to overturn 
capital punishment as such. Loose construction interpretation of the Eighth Amendment has been 
more successful in designating the execution of certain groups as cruel and unusual because of 
the evolving standards of decency doctrine. A more strict construction approach to the 
Fourteenth Amendment restrains  due process and any changes may be accommodated by the 
states so that they may retain capital punishment.49 Therefore, in upholding the constitutionality 
of capital punishment, the United States Supreme Court has utilized a strict construction 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which has led the opponents 
of capital punishment to abandon the Due Process Approach and look to the Eighth Amendment, 
for which the justices utilize a loose construction interpretation. 
Endnotes 
 
1 Quote from George Orwell, The Road to Wigan Pier (Quotes on Capital Punishment, 
http://www.notable-quotes.com/c/capital_punishment_quotes.html). 
2 Capital punishment is defined as execution (death) for a criminal offense. Offenses are 
called “capital” since the defendant could lose his/her head (Latin for caput). The means of 
capital punishment used in the United States include lethal injection, electrocution, gas chamber, 
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hanging, and firing squad. All capital offenses require automatic appeals, which means that 
approximately 2,500 men and women are presently on “death row” awaiting their appeals or 
death. Crimes punishable by death vary from state to state. A charge of a capital offense usually 
means no bail will be allowed (Ducat, Craig R). See Appendices J and K for capital punishments 
and methods of execution by state. 
3 Constitutional Interpretation: how a particular court, in this case Supreme Court, 
determines whether an action of the legislature, executive or judiciary contravenes the 
Constitution. In his article Constitutional Interpretation: Powers of government, Craig R. Ducat 
mentions that the several modes of judicial review must “interconnect” three elements: the 
justification for the review of government power in question, the standard of constitutionality to 
be applied to the courts, and the method by which judges support the conclusion that a given 
governmental action does or does not violate the Constitution (Ducat 76). The power of 
constitutional interpretation is also referred to as judicial review, which was established in 1803 
by the famous case of Marbury v. Madison. See Appendix B for Article III of the United States 
Constitution. See Appendices D and E for the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
4 The United Supreme Court interprets the Eighth Amendment of the United States  
Constitution when determining the constitutionality of the capital punishment during a particular  
case. The justices determine whether or not the instance of capital punishment has violated the  
Amendment’s provision against cruel and unusual punishment and evolving standards of 
decency. Cruel and unusual punishment is defined as, “governmental penalties against convicted 
criminal defendants which are barbaric, involve torture and/or shock the public morality” 
(Law.com Dictionary). See Appendix D for the Eighth Amendment. 
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5 Strict Construction: Broad term for the traditional approach to constitutional 
interpretation. Constructional provisions are read literally, either permitting or restricting 
government actions (Ducat). Loose Construction: Based on the Necessary and Proper Clause and 
General Welfare Clause. It relies on broad interpretation of the Constitution and the powers of 
Congress. Sometimes loose constructionists debate with strict construction over what the 
Founders intended (Pervis). 
 
6 These dates refer to two cases, Furman v. Georgia (1972) and Gregg v. Georgia (1976), 
which will be further explored in this paper. In these cases the Eighth Amendment was applied to 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Incorporation Doctrine, which will be explained 
further in the course of this essay. See Appendices D and E for the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. See Appendices Y-AA for Information about the death penalty prior to 1972. 
 
7
 The doctrine of judicial review was not created by Chief Justice John Marshall, the 
doctrine had its origins in early 17th century England. The case merely solidified the doctrine as a 
power of the Court when it held that the Judiciary Act of 1789 violated Article III of the United 
States Constitution. See Appendix B for Article III and Appendix F for Section 13 of Judiciary 
Act of 1789. 
 
8
 The Federalist tries to answer this question for the founding generations and subsequent 
generations, and the soundness of that answer has nothing to do with the personalities advancing 
it. Federalist 1 presents the Constitution as a means to “the preservation of the Union and then 
enhancement of the nation’s liberty…dignity… and happiness” (Barber 36). Therefore, The 
Federalist embraces a positive constitutionalism. Regarding judicial power, in Federalist 78 
Publius famously argues that judicial review is not undemocratic because it implies 
constitutional supremacy rather than judicial supremacy. Constitutional supremacy as the 
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“supremacy of the higher law of ‘We the People’ embodied in the Constitution over the ordinary 
law of agents of the people represented in legislation” (Barber 55). Publius saw the federal 
judiciary as, “one of the instruments for making the public sensible of its true interests” (Barber 
55). 
9 These forms are discussed by Sotirios Barber and James E. Fleming in their book, 
Constitutional Interpretation: The Basic Questions. The authors believe that the “philosophic 
approach” is the best or most defensible approach to Constitutional Interpretation. This approach 
will be discussed in a later portion of the essay. 
 
10 The Ninth Amendment provides: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” In laymen’s 
terms, the rights of Americans include rights in addition to those enumerated. However, Black’s 
texualist point of view holds that the only constitutional rights are those enumerated in the text. 
He believes that is undemocratic for unelected judges to invent rights against majoritarian 
government beyond those rights specified in the text. Unwritten constitutional rights, like the 
right to privacy, are merely inventions of judges. The authors’ believe that Black’s claim to be 
governed by plain words turns out to be a way to escape responsibility for controversial choices 
(Barber 70). 
11 Original Intentions of the Framers of the Constitution can be either concrete or abstract.  
“Concrete” originalism holds that the framers’ intended their conceptions of justice even if (1)  
that conceptions was seen as unjust at the time, or if (2) it should prove unjust later, and if (3)  
intending injustice is itself unjust (Barber 84). While “abstract” originalism illustrates that the  
words and phrases of the constitutional document express a relatively clear set of intentions or  
meanings, if by meanings the Framers meant general concepts and ideas and if by intentions they  
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meant abstract intentions.  Barber and Fleming assert that because constitutional provisions like  
due process are expressed as general concepts, the constitutional text itself is evidence that the  
framers’ intentions were abstract. Thus, the Constitution does not define its terms or give  
examples of their proper applications (Barber 83). Robert Bork is a supporter of intentionalism 
for judges. Bork affirms that intentionalism would be mandatory for judges even if the Framers 
had not intended intentionalism for judges (Barber 81). 
 12
 For example, according to John Hart Ely, a best-known structuralist, a woman does not  
have a constitutional right to an abortion because the Constitution’s “open-ended” provisions  
(“due process,” “equal protection” and the Ninth Amendment) should include only those  
“unremunerated” rights essential to representative democracy, which he argues is the  
Constitution’s leading structural value (Barber 118). Similarly, McCulloch v. Maryland (1819)  
represents differences in opinions about the nature of American federalism (national federalism  
versus states’ rights federalism) that persist today and reflect fundamental disagreements on the  
“basic normative” properties of the Constitution (Barber118). Barber and Fleming write that the  
question is not what the Constitution means a whole; it is what we ought to say it means. 
 
13
 Marshall and other Federalists favored this mode of constitutional interpretation.   
Loose construction allows the government to go beyond Article I Section 8 restrictions. Marshall 
believed that the government’s actions should be aimed at exercising its Article I powers. See  
Appendix A for Article I Section 8 of the Constitution. 
14 The approach favored by Sotirios Barber and James E. Fleming, authors of  
Constitutional Interpretation: The Basic Question. They favor the broader “philosophic  
approach” to “moral reading” because they believe that fidelity to the Constitution requires, “a  
reliance on the social sciences” as well as the “fusion of constitutional law and moral theory”  
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(from Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,  
1997, 149). 
 15 Barber and Fleming propose that good-faith constitutional interpretation requires a  
willingness to change our minds about the major and minor premises of past constitutional  
interpretations. There is a need to strive for (1) morally and/or scientifically sound  
understandings of constitutional provisions that appear in the major premises of legal syllogisms,  
and (2) true or sound accounts of the world that appear in minor premises. Interpretation requires  
that judges and other interpreters make up their own minds about constitutional meaning in a  
“spirit of self-critical striving to realize our constitutional commitments and to interpret the  
Constitution to make it the best it can be” (Barber xiii). For example, the change from Plessy to 
Brown, as well as other important changes in constitutional interpretation, illustrates the 
philosophic approach. The goal of the philosophic approach is truth or best understanding of 
constitutional commitments as distinguished from opinion. Also, the approach embraces other 
interpretation approaches discussed by the authors. 
 16 An example of such precedent is the “separate but equal” doctrine of the Equal  
Protection Clause, created in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), which was later overturned by Brown v. 
Board of Education in 1954. 
 17 This is so according to Barber and Fleming because constitutional law is an area where 
it is generally agreed that courts can err about constitutional meaning and later courts may 
legitimately cancel the precedential value of old cases by overruling them. Precedents 
characteristically come in lines of decisions or series, and judges who would follow precedent 
typically ask what a whole series says about the law (Barber 136). This was the case when the 
Court considered Brown v. Board of Education (1954), in which stare decisis pointed to Plessy 
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and Sweatt v. Painter (1950), which further elaborated the doctrine of “separate but equal.” 
Brown ultimately overruled Plessy and Sweatt. Stare decisis cannot eliminate controversial 
choices in hard cases; doctrinalism cannot avoid the burdens and responsibilities of philosophic 
reflection and choice in such cases (Barber 140). 
 18   Stare decisis is a legal policy that means letting the precedent stand as decided. 
 
19 Barber and Fleming break down the consensualist view using abortion as an example, 
which is another very controversial topic like capital punishment. The Major Premise breaks 
down as; Liberty (as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment) includes 
only what a current social consensus says it includes. The Minor Premise would then be; a 
current social consensus supports no more than a liberty to decide to have an abortion in cases of 
rape, incest, or serious fetal deformity. The conclusion would therefore be; liberty (at present) 
includes a liberty to have an abortion only in those three circumstances. 
20 Also, in Virginia, where slavery prevailed over religion, property crimes and a separate 
code for slaves was emphasized as death penalty crimes. In Pennsylvania however, Quaker 
sentiment strongly opposed capital punishment and the legislature made murder alone a capital 
crime. 
21
 Quote from historian Louis Masur (Quoted Oshinsky 5). 
22 During the 1800s executions declined along with the public spectacle that once 
surrounded them. By the Civil War many states including Michigan, Rhode Island, and 
Wisconsin had abolished the death penalty, while others had reduced the number of capital 
crimes. Any further reform or outright abolitions would be annihilated by the Civil War and the 
aftermath of Reconstruction, the “lawlessness of Reconstruction further convinced Americans of 
all regions of the need for extreme punishment to restore social order” (Oshinsky 8). However, 
Paone 21 
 
the Progressive Era of the early 1900s brought with it the abolition of the death penalty in many 
state, but the Great Depression of the 1930s, with its “fear of crime and disorder” would raise the 
number or executions to new levels (Oshinsky 8).  Unlike the North, the South seemed 
“historically averse to national concerns” (Oshinsky9). Oshinsky writes, “But what truly defined 
the South, and isolated it from the national mainstream, was the legacy of slavery” (Oshinsky 9-
10). The South’s reliance on capital punishment had been geared toward “racial control” and a 
continuation of its “race-based vigilante tradition” (Oshinsky10). 
23
 See Appendices C and D for the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. See Appendix BB for 
some of the Founders’ thoughts on capital punishment. 
24
 It is now widely held that most of the Bill of Rights is incorporated so as to apply to the 
states by virtue of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Incorporation 
Doctrine was created after the Fourteenth Amendment, and at that time the Bill of Rights was 
held initially to apply only to the federal government (Barron v. Baltimore 1833). See Appendix 
L for a list of federal capital offenses. 
25 Latin for “by the court,” each justice wrote a separate opinion; none were persuaded to 
join with another.  Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall were ready to strike down capital 
punishment on Eighth Amendment grounds. Nixon appointees Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and 
Rehnquist were on the opposite end, while Stewart and White were somewhere in the middle. 
Thurgood Marshall wrote, “I cannot believe that at this stage in our history, the American people 
would ever knowingly support purposeless vengeance” (Oshinsky 50).  Brennan’s opinion 
restated his view that a punishment is “cruel and unusual if it does not comport with human 
dignity and inflicts pointless suffering on the individual” (Oshinsky 51).  
26 In his opinion Justice Stewart referred to Wilkerson v. Utah (1879), in which the  
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justices ruled, “[I]t is safe to affirm that punishments of torture . . . and all others in the same line  
of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment . . .” Stewart continued on to state that  
the Court has not confined the prohibition embodied in the Eighth Amendment to “barbarous”  
methods that were generally outlawed in the 18th century. Instead, the Amendment has been  
interpreted in a flexible and dynamic manner. Thus the Clause forbidding “cruel and unusual 
punishments is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes  
enlightened by a humane justice” (Furman).  
 
27 In his dissent Justice Brennan wrote, “The fatal constitutional infirmity in the  
punishment of death is that it treats members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to be  
toyed with and discarded. [It is] thus inconsistent with the fundamental premise of the Clause  
[forbidding cruel and unusual punishment] that even the vilest criminal remains a human being  
possessed of common human dignity.  As such it is a penalty that subjects the individual to a fate  
forbidden by the principle of civilized treatment guaranteed by the [Clause]. I therefore would  
hold, on that ground alone, that death is today a cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the  
Clause.  Justice of this kind is obviously no less shocking than the crime itself, and the new  
‘official’ murder, far from offering redress for the offense committed against society, adds  
instead a second defilement to the first” (Gregg v. Georgia). Justice Marshall held loyal to the  
view he formed in Furman v. Georgia that the death penalty is a “cruel and unusual punishment  
prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.” In Furman Marshall concluded that the  
death penalty is constitutionally invalid for two reasons, “First, the death penalty is  
excessive. And second, the American people, fully informed as to the purposes of the death  
penalty and its liabilities, would in my view reject it as morally unacceptable” (Gregg v.  
Georgia). 
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28The problem with the Due Process Approach is that it invites the government to change  
procedure in order to circumvent restrictions. The Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual  
provision is more restrictive. In Gregg the Court determined that new death penalty procedures 
were not cruel and unusual, hence the Eighth Amendment was also applicable to the case. 
 
29
 McClesky was challenging the Baldus study, two sophisticated statistical studies that  
examined over 2,000 murder cases that occurred in Georgia during the 1970’s. The raw numbers  
collected by Professor Baldus indicated that defendants charged with killing white persons  
received the death penalty in 11% of the cases, but defendants charged with killing blacks  
received the death penalty in only 1% of the cases. The raw numbers also indicated a reverse  
racial disparity according to the race of the defendant: 4% of the black defendants received the  
death penalty, as opposed to 7% of the white defendants. It was indicated that black defendants,  
such as McClesky, who kill white victims have the greatest likelihood of receiving the death  
penalty. McClesky claimed that the Baldus study demonstrated that he was discriminated against  
because of his race and because of the race of his victim. In its broadest form, McClesky’s claim  
of discrimination extends to every actor in the Georgia capital sentencing process, from the  
prosecutor who sought the death penalty and the jury that imposed the sentence, to the State  
itself that enacted the capital punishment statute and allows it to remain in effect despite its  
allegedly discriminatory application (McClesky v. Kempp 1978). See Appendix M for 
demographic characteristics of prisoners executed and Appendix P for the number persons 
executed by race/method. 
30 Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 
31 Pulley v. Harris, supra, at 43. 
32 The most recent case is Panetti v. Quarterman (2007). In the case the Court ruled on  
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whether the Eighth Amendment permits the execution of a prisoner whose mental illness  
deprives him of “the mental capacity to understand that [he] is being executed as a punishment  
for a crime.” Using the Due Process Approach, Panetti illustrates a minor attempt at extending  
Due Process by trying to stretch beyond the limits of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death  
Penalty Act of 1996. The rest of the case was an Eighth Amendment case that referred to Ford v.  
Wainwright (1986), which prohibits the execution of the mentally ill. See Appendix G: More 
Post 1972 Supreme Court Capital Punishment Rulings. 
33
 The Eighth Amendment succinctly prohibits “[e]xcessive” sanctions. It provides:  
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual  
punishments inflicted” (Atkins v. Virginia). See Appendix V for Death Penalty Public  
Opinion Polls. 
 
34
 The majority utilized a loose construction interpretation for their holdings. They further 
stated, “Having pinpointed that the ‘clearest and most reliable objective’ evidence of  
contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures. The practice (of  
executing mentally retarded offenders), therefore, has become truly unusual, and it is fair to say  
that a national consensus has developed against it... As was our approach in Ford v. Wainwright,  
477 U.S. 399 (1986), with regard to insanity, “we leave to the State[s] the task of developing  
appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences”  
(Atkins). Both “evolving standards of decency” and loose construction constitutional  
interpretation allow for the definition of what is cruel and unusual to change over time.  This is 
why both principles fit so closely together. See Appendix R for Information about Justices Who 
Authored Important Majority Opinions. 
35 Rehnquist wrote, “The Court’s suggestion that these sources are relevant to the  
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constitutional question finds little support in our precedents and, in my view, is antithetical to  
considerations of federalism, which instruct that any permanent prohibition upon all units of  
democratic government must [be apparent] in the operative acts (laws and the application of  
laws) that the people have approved” (Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 377 1989). See 
Appendix S for Information about Justices Who Authored Major Dissenting Opinions. 
 
36
 The liberal, moderate, and conservative members of the Court, such as Kennedy and  
Rehnquist, believe in evolving standards of decency. However, the liberal members hold that it is  
the responsibility of the Court to decide how the standards affect the definition of cruel and  
unusual, while the conservatives hold that it is the duty of the legislator. 
 
37 Chief Justice Rehnquist continued, “More importantly, however, they can be reconciled  
with the undeniable precepts that the democratic branches of government and individual  
sentencing juries are, by design, better suited than courts to evaluating and giving effect to the  
complex societal and moral considerations that inform the selection of publicly acceptable  
criminal punishments” (Atkins). The ruling contained aspects of both strict and loose 
construction interpretation of capital punishment. Aspects of strict construction allows for  
democratic determination of due process while loose allows the standards of evolving decency to 
change over time—what people think is cruel and unusual. 
 
38
 In Stanford v. Kentucky (1989) the Court determined whether it is permissible under  
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution to execute a juvenile offender who 
 was older than 15 but younger than 18 when he committed a capital crime. A divided Court  
rejected the proposition that the Constitution bars capital punishment for juvenile offenders in  
this age group. See Appendix V for Death Penalty Public Opinion Polls. 
 
39
 Juveniles were not to be classified as “the worst sort of offender” because according to  
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the majority, “Three general differences between juveniles under 18 and adults demonstrate that  
juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders: [a] lack of  
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in  
adults and are more understandable among the young. These qualities often result in impetuous  
and ill-considered actions and decisions. The second area of difference is that juveniles are more  
vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.  
The third broad difference is that the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an  
adult. The personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed. These differences render  
suspect any conclusion that a juvenile falls among the worst offenders. The susceptibility of  
juveniles to immature and irresponsible behavior means. Their irresponsible conduct is not as  
morally reprehensible as that of an adult” (Roper). 
 
40
 O’Connor wrote, “Indeed, the evidence before us fails to demonstrate conclusively that  
any such consensus has emerged in the brief period since we upheld the constitutionality of this  
practice in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). But the Court has adduced no evidence  
impeaching the seemingly reasonable conclusion reached by many state legislatures: that at least  
some 17-year-old murderers are sufficiently mature to deserve the death penalty in an  
appropriate case. Nor has it been shown that capital sentencing juries are incapable of accurately  
assessing a youthful defendant’s maturity or of giving due weight to the mitigating 
characteristics associated with youth” (Roper). See Appendix O for statistics on offenders’ age at 
time of arrest for their capital offense. 
 
41 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977), plurality opinion 
 
42 O’Connor stated, “The proportionality issues raised by the Court clearly implicate  
Eighth Amendment concerns. But these concerns may properly be addressed not by means of an  
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arbitrary, categorical age-based rule, but rather through individualized sentencing in which juries  
are required to give appropriate mitigating weight to the defendant’s immaturity, his  
susceptibility to outside pressures, his cognizance of the consequences of his actions, and so  
forth. In that way the constitutional response can be tailored to the specific problem it is meant to  
remedy” (Roper). 
 43
 Scalia continued, “Because I do not believe that the meaning of our Eighth  
Amendment, any more than the meaning of other provisions of our Constitution, should be  
determined by the subjective views of five Members of this Court and like-minded foreigners, I  
dissent” (Roper). Scalia is a “faint-hearted” originalist when it comes to cruel and unusual  
punishment. It is Scalia’s belief that originalism is the “lesser evil” to nonorginalist constitutional 
interpretation because it is more compatible with the nature and purpose of the Constitution 
(from his article, “Originalism: The Lesser Evil”). See Appendix U for Global Death Penalty Use 
in 2009. 
44
 Scalia wrote, “None of our cases dealing with an alleged constitutional limitation upon 
the death penalty has counted, as States supporting a consensus in favor of that limitation, States 
that have eliminated the death penalty entirely. What might be relevant, perhaps, is how many of 
those States permit 16- and 17-year-old offenders to be treated as adults with respect to 
noncapital offenses. To support its opinion that States should be prohibited from imposing the 
death penalty on anyone who committed murder before age 18, the Court looks to scientific and 
sociological studies, picking and choosing those that support its position. It never explains why 
those particular studies are methodologically sound; none was ever entered into evidence or 
tested in an adversarial proceeding” (Roper). The “proposition” Scalia refers to is the idea that in 
determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual the Court must look to the “evolving 
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standards of decency,” not a “national consensus.” This is so due to the fact that founding era 
capital punishment methods are not proposed as death penalty methods today. In part Scalia 
accepts the idea of evolving standards of decency. See Appendix T for Number of Executions by 
State since 1976. 
 
45
 In their argument the majority wrote, “The asserted problems related to the IV lines do  
not establish a sufficiently substantial risk of harm to meet the requirements of the Eighth  
Amendment. Kentucky has put in place several important safeguards to ensure that an adequate  
dose of sodium thiopental is delivered to the condemned prisoner. Nor does Kentucky’s failure  
to adopt petitioners’ proposed alternatives demonstrate that the Commonwealth's execution  
procedure is cruel and unusual. Kentucky has adopted a method of execution believed to be the  
most humane available, one it shares with 35 other States” (Baze). 
46 “Our society has nonetheless steadily moved to more humane methods of carrying out  
capital punishment. The firing squad, hanging, the electric chair, and the gas chamber have each  
in turn given way to more humane methods, culminating in today's consensus on lethal injection”  
(Baze). See Appendix K for Methods of Execution by State. 
 
47 The dissent’s argument rested upon the fact that the Court has considered the  
constitutionality of a specific method of execution on only three prior occasions. Those cases,  
and other decisions cited by the parties and amici, provide little guidance on the standard that  
should govern petitioner’s challenge to Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol. In Wilkerson v.  
Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879), the Court held that death by firing squad did not rank among the  
“cruel and unusual punishments” banned by the Eighth Amendment. In so ruling, the Court did  
not endeavor “to define with exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which provides  
that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted.” Next, in In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436  
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(1890), death by electrocution was the assailed method of execution. The Court reiterated that  
the Eighth Amendment prohibits “torture” and “lingering death.” The word “cruel,” the Court  
further observed, “implies . . . something inhuman . . . something more than the mere  
extinguishment of life.” Those statements, however, were made en passant. Kemmler's actual  
holding was that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to the States, a proposition the Court  
since repudiated, see, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Finally, in Louisiana ex  
rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947), the Court rejected Eighth and Fourteenth  
Amendment challenges to a re-electrocution following an earlier attempt that failed to cause  
death (Baze). See Appendix CC for Reports on the Cruelty of Certain Execution Methods. 
48 Closing Ginsburg wrote, “I agree with petitioners and the plurality that the degree of  
risk, magnitude of pain, and availability of alternatives must be considered. I part ways with the  
plurality, however, to the extent its “substantial risk” test sets a fixed threshold for the first  
factor. The three factors are interrelated; a strong showing on one reduces the importance of the  
others. Proof of “a slightly or marginally safer alternative” is, as the plurality notes, insufficient. 
But if readily available measures can materially increase the likelihood that the protocol will 
cause no pain, a State fails to adhere to contemporary standards of decency if it declines to 
employ those measures (Baze). 
 
49
 The Fourteenth Amendment prescribes established due process procedure, and when  
utilized to consider the constitutionality of capital punishment it looks more to what the  
government is doing. The Eighth Amendment on the other hand looks at what the criminal is— 
mentally retarded or a juvenile, for example. It is easier to attack capital punishment through the  
Eighth Amendment because once it has been determined that a certain category of people are not  
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subject to capital punishment, the states cannot change the rule. See Appendix W for a list of 
Pro-Death Penalty Organizations and Appendix X for a list of Anti-Death Penalty Organizations. 
See Appendix DD for a Pro-Death Penalty Article. 
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Appendix A 
Article I Section 8 of the United States Constitution 
 
Article I Section 8: 
Section. 8. 
The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the 
Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all 
Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States; 
To borrow Money on the credit of the United States; 
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes; 
To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies 
throughout the United States; 
To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights 
and Measures; 
To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United 
States; 
To establish Post Offices and post Roads; 
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries; 
To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court; 
To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the 
Law of Nations; 
To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on 
Land and Water; 
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer 
Term than two Years; 
To provide and maintain a Navy; 
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; 
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To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections 
and repel Invasions; 
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of 
them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States 
respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according 
to the discipline prescribed by Congress; 
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten 
Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become 
the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places 
purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the 
Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings;--And 
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing 
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, 
or in any Department or Officer thereof. 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The United States Constitution.  
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_transcript.html 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B 
Article III of the United States Constitution 
 
Article III- 
Section 1- The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in 
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, 
both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and 
shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation, which shall not be diminished 
during their Continuance in Office. 
Section 2-The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all 
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the United States shall 
be a Party;--to Controversies between two or more States;-- between a State and Citizens of 
another State,--between Citizens of different States,--between Citizens of the same State 
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claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and 
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The United States Constitution.  
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_transcript.html 
 
 
Appendix C 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
 
Fifth Amendment: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or 
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be 
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The United States Constitution, The Bill of Rights 
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Appendix D 
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
 
Eighth Amendment:  
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted. 
 
[Ratified 1791] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The United States Constitution, The Bill of Rights 
Appendix E 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Sec. 1 
 
Fourteenth Amendment- Section 1: 
 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
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Source: The United States Constitution.  
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_amendments_11-27.html 
 
Appendix F 
Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 
 
Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: 
The Supreme Court shall have the exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of civil nature, 
where a state is a party, except between a state and citizens of other states, or aliens, in which 
latter case it shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction… and shall have the authority to 
issue writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts 
appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ducat, Craig R. Constitutional Interpretation: Powers of government. Cengage Learning,  
2008. 9th ed. 
 
Appendix G 
More Post 1972 Supreme Court Capital Punishment Rulings  
CASE:        RULING: 
Woodson v. North Carolina (1976) Mandatory death sentences for first-degree murder 
violate the 8th and 14th Amendments (Due Process 
Approach). 
Coker v. Georgia (1977) The 8th Amendment prohibits the implementation 
of the death penalty for rape of an adult when the 
victim is not killed (Eighth Amendment Approach). 
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Lockett v. Ohio (1978) Held that states may not limit the mitigating factors 
juries consider in imposing the death sentence; must 
allow for individualized sentencing (Due Process 
Approach). 
Enmund v. Florida (1982) Held that the Eighth Amendment forbids the 
imposition of capital punishment on those who aid 
and abet, but do not commit, a felony in which 
murder is also committed (Due Process Approach). 
Spaziano v. Florida  (1984) The Court held that Florida’s law allowing a judge 
to override the jury’s death recommendation of life 
in prison did not constitute double jeopardy, and did 
not violate the constitutional requirement of 
reliability in capital sentencing (Due Process 
Approach). 
Ford v. Wainwright (1986) The Court held that the execution of the insane was 
unconstitutional (Eighth Amendment Approach-
restrict capital punishment). 
Thompson v. Oklahoma (1988)  The Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty 
on offenders who were under the age of 16 when 
their crimes were committed (Due Process 
Approach) 
Felker v. Turpin (1996) A unanimous Court upheld the provisions of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
19961 (Due Process Approach-strengthening of due 
process). 
Buchanan v. Angelone (1997) The Eighth Amendment does not require that a 
capital jury be instructed on the concept of 
mitigating evidence generally, or on particular 
statutory mitigating factors (Eighth Amendment 
Approach).  
Panetti v. Quarterman (2007) The Court ruled that the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits the execution of a prisoner whose mental 
illness deprives him of "the mental capacity to 
understand that [he] is being executed as a 
punishment for a crime" (Due Process Approach). 
Kennedy v. Louisiana (2008) The Court struck down as unconstitutional a 
Louisiana statute that allowed the death penalty for 
the rape of a child where the victim did not die. 
"Based both on consensus and our own independent 
                                                 
1
 The law limits state prisoners’ filings second or successive applications for writes of habeas 
corpus if no new claim is presented. The act also creates a “gate-keeping” mechanism in 
requiring a three-judge panel to review an inmate’s second or successive habeas applications and 
authorizes their denial without the possibility of further appeal. 
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judgment, our holding is that a death sentence for 
one who raped but did not kill a child, and who did 
not intend to assist another in killing the child, is 
unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments." 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: O’Brien, David M. Constitutional Law and Politics. Vol. 2 7 ed. Pages 1222-1225 
 
Appendix H 
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Death Penalty Fact Sheet (The Death Penalty Information Center) 
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Source: Death Penalty Information Center. http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/united-states  
supreme-court-decisions-1972-1996 
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Appendix I 
Capital Punishment on Trial: Table Executions (1930-1967) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Oshinsky, David M. Capital Punishment on Trial: Furman v. Georgia and the Death  
Penalty in Modern America. University Press of Kansas 2010. 
 
Appendix J 
Bureau of Justice Statistics: Table- Capital Punishment by State, 2007 
Capital Punishment, 2007 - Statistical Tables 
 
Table 1. Capital offenses by State, 2007 
State       Offense 
 
Alabama  Intentional murder with 18 aggravating factors (Ala. Stat. Ann. 
13A-5-40(a)(1)-(18)). 
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Arizona  First-degree murder accompanied by at least 1 of 14 Aggravating 
factors (A.R.S. § 13-703(F)). 
Arkansas    Capital murder (Ark. Code Ann. 5-10-101) with a finding of at 
least 1 of 10 aggravating circumstances; treason. 
Revision: Amended the definition of capital murder to include 
murder committed in the course of robbery, aggravated robbery, 
residential burglary, or commercial burglary (Ark. Cod Ann. § 5-
10-101 (Supp. 2007)), effective 7/31/2007. 
California  First-degree murder with special circumstances; train wrecking; 
treason; perjury causing execution. 
Colorado    First-degree murder with at least 1 of 17 aggravating factors; 
first-degree kidnapping resulting in death; treason. 
Connecticut    Capital felony with 8 forms of aggravated homicide (C.G.S. § 
53a-54b). 
Delaware  First-degree murder with at least 1 statutory aggravating 
circumstance (11 Del. C. § 4209). 
Florida     First-degree murder; felony murder; capital drug trafficking; 
capital sexual battery. 
Georgia    Murder; kidnapping with bodily injury or ransom when the victim 
dies; aircraft hijacking; treason. 
Idaho     First-degree murder with aggravating factors; aggravated 
kidnapping; perjury resulting in death. 
Illinois    First-degree murder with 1 of 21 aggravating circumstances. 
Indiana    Murder with 16 aggravating circumstances (IC 35-50-2-9). 
Kansas  Capital murder with 8 aggravating circumstances (KSA 21-3439, 
KSA 21-4625). 
Kentucky    Murder with aggravating factors; kidnapping with aggravating 
factors (KRS 32.025). 
Louisiana  First-degree murder; aggravated rape of victim under age 13 
treason (La. R.S. 14:30, 14:42, and 14:113). 
Maryland  First-degree murder, either premeditated or during the commission 
of a felony, provided that certain death eligibility requirements are 
satisfied. 
Mississippi    Capital murder (Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)); aircraft piracy 
(Miss. Code Ann. § 97-25-55(1)). 
Missouri  First-degree murder (565.020 RSMO 2000). Revision: Added to 
the capital statute provisions for selecting members of the 
execution team and prohibiting disclosure of the identity of anyone 
who has been on the execution team (Mo. Rev. Stat § 546.720), 
Effective 8/28/2007. 
Montana  Capital murder with 1 of 9 aggravating circumstances (Mont. Code 
Ann. § 46-18-303); aggravated sexual intercourse without consent 
(Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-503). 
Nebraska    First-degree murder with a finding of at least 1 statutorily defined 
aggravating circumstance. 
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Nevada  First-degree murder with at least 1 of 15 aggravating  
circumstances (NRS 200.030, 200.033, 200.035). 
New Hampshire   Six categories of capital murder (RSA 630:1, RSA 630:5). 
New Mexico    First-degree murder with at least 1 of 7 statutorily-defined 
aggravating circumstances (Section 30-2-1 A, NMSA). 
New York  First-degree murder with 1 of 13 aggravating factors (NY Penal 
Law §125.27). 
North Carolina   First-degree murder (NCGS §14-17). 
Ohio  Aggravated murder with at least 1 of 10 aggravating circumstances 
(O.R.C. secs. 2903.01, 2929.02, and 2929.04). 
Oklahoma  First-degree murder in conjunction with a finding of at least 1 of 8 
statutorily-defined aggravating circumstances; sex crimes against a 
child under 14 years of age. 
Oregon    Aggravated murder (ORS 163.095). 
Pennsylvania   First-degree murder with 18 aggravating circumstances. 
South Carolina  Murder with 1 of 12 aggravating circumstances (§ 16-3-20(C) 
(a)); criminal sexual conduct with a minor with 1 of 9 aggravators 
(§ 16-3-655).Revision: Added as an aggravating circumstance 
murder committed while in the commission of first-degree arson 
(§16-3-20(C)(a)(1)(j)), effective 6/18/2007. 
South Dakota              First-degree murder with 1 of 10 aggravating circumstances. 
Revision: Amended the code of criminal procedure to allow for 
use of a 3-drug protocol in administering lethal injection(SDCL § 
23A-27A-32), effective 7/1/2007. 
Tennessee   First-degree murder with 1 of 15 aggravating circumstances 
(Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204).Revision: Amended the definition 
of first-degree murder to include killing in the perpetration of rape 
or aggravated rape of a child (Tenn Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(2)), 
effective 7/1/2007. 
Texas     Criminal homicide with 1 of 9 aggravating circumstances (Tex. 
Penal Code § 19.03); super aggravated sexual assault (Tex. Penal 
Code § 12.42(c)(3)). Revision: Revised the penal code and the 
code of criminal procedure to allow the death penalty for 
aggravated sexual assault of victims under the age of 14 when the 
offender has a previous conviction for a similar offense (TX Penal 
Code § 12.42(c)(3) and Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 37.072), 
effective 9/1/2007.  
Utah Aggravated murder (76-5-202, Utah Code Annotated). Revision: 
Amended the criminal code to allow for an automatic sentence of 
life without parole if the death penalty is ruled unconstitutional 
(Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207) and added to the definition of 
aggravated murder intentional killing 
Virginia    First-degree murder with 1 of 15 aggravating circumstances 
(VA Code § 18.2-31).Revision: Added to the definition of capital 
murder willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of a judge or a 
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witness when the killing is for the purpose of interfering with the 
person's duties in a criminal case (Va. Code § 18.2-31(14) and 
(15)), effective 7/1/2007. 
Washington    Aggravated first-degree murder. 
Wyoming First-degree murder. Revision: Added as a capital offense murder 
during the commission of sexual abuse of a minor (W.S. § 6-2-
101), effective 7/1/2007. 
 
Note: New Jersey enacted legislation repealing the death penalty (P.L. 2007, 
c.204 (NJSA 2C:11-3)), effective 12/17/2007. 
Nine states revised statutory provisions relating to the death penalty during 2007. 
The Colorado Supreme Court struck a portion of that state’s capital statute on 
April 23, 2007 (People v. Montour, 157 P.3d 489 (Colo. 2007)). The statute 
(Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-1201(1)(a)) specified that defendants pleading guilty 
to a class 1 felony be sentenced by the judge, thereby requiring defendants to 
waive their right to a jury trial on all facts essential to determining death penalty 
eligibility as established in Ring v. Arizona. The court ruled that this was 
unconstitutional under Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Source: National Prisoner Statistics Program (NPS-8). 
See also Methodology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics  
 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/cp/2007/cp07st.pdf 
 
Appendix K 
 
Bureau of Justice Statistics: Table-Method of Execution by State, 2007 
 
Table 2. Method of execution, by State, 2007 
Lethal Injection  Electrocution  Lethal gas  Hanging   Firing Squad 
Alabamaa   Alabamaa   Arizonaa,b  Delaware a,c   Idahoa 
Arizonaa,b   Arkansasa,d   Californiaa       New Hampshirea,e  Oklahomaf 
Arkansasa,d   Floridaa   Missouria  Washingtona   Utahg 
Californiaa  llinoisa,h   Wyomingi 
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Colorado   Kentuckya,j 
Connecticut   Nebraska 
Delawarea,c   Oklahomaf 
Floridaa   South Carolinaa 
Georgia   Tennesseea,k 
Idahoa    Virginiaa 
Illinoisa 
Indiana 
Kansas 
Kentuckya,j 
Louisiana 
Maryland 
Mississippi 
Missouria 
Montana 
Nevada 
New Hampshirea 
New Mexico 
New York 
North Carolina 
Ohio 
Oklahomaa 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
South Carolinaa 
South Dakota 
Tennesseea,k 
Texas 
Utaha 
Virginiaa 
Washingtona 
Wyominga 
 
Note: The method of execution of Federal prisoners is lethal injection, pursuant to 28 
CFR, Part 26. For offenses under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 
1994, the execution method is that of the State in which the conviction took place (18 U. 
S.C. 3596). 
a Authorizes two methods of execution. 
b Authorizes lethal injection for persons sentenced after November 15, 1992; inmates 
sentenced before that date may select lethal injection or gas. 
c
 Authorizes lethal injection for those whose capital offense occurred on or after June 13, 
1986; those who committed the offense before that date may select lethal injection or 
hanging. 
d
 Authorizes lethal injection for those whose offense occurred on or after July 4, 1983; 
inmates whose offense occurred before that date may select lethal injection or 
electrocution. 
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e
 Authorizes hanging only if lethal injection cannot be given. 
f Authorizes electrocution if lethal injection is held to be unconstitutional, and firing squad 
if both lethal injection and electrocution are held to be unconstitutional. 
g
 Authorizes firing squad if lethal injection is held unconstitutional. Inmates who selected 
execution by firing squad prior to May 3, 2004, may still be entitled to execution by that 
method. 
h
 Authorizes electrocution only if lethal injection is held illegal or unconstitutional. 
I
 Authorizes lethal gas if lethal injection is held to be unconstitutional. 
j
 Authorizes lethal injection for persons sentenced on or after March 31, 1998; inmates 
sentenced before that date may select lethal injection or electrocution. 
k
 Authorizes lethal injection for those whose capital offense occurred after December 31, 
1998; those who committed the offense before that date may select electrocution by 
written waiver. 
Source: National Prisoner Statistics Program (NPS-8). 
See also Methodology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics  
 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/cp/2007/cp07st.pdf 
Appendix L 
 
Bureau of Justice Statistics: Table-Federal Capital Offenses, 2007 
 
Capital Punishment, 2007- Statistical Tables 
 
Table 3. Federal capital offenses, 2007 
 
Statute       Description                              
8 U.S.C. 1342   Murder related to the smuggling of aliens. 
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18 U.S.C. 32-34  Destruction of aircraft, motor vehicles, or related facilities 
resulting in death. 
18 U.S.C. 36    Murder committed during a drug-related drive-by shooting. 
18 U.S.C. 37    Murder committed at an airport serving international civil aviation. 
18 U.S.C. 115(b)(3) 
[by cross-reference to 18 
U.S.C. 1111] 
Retaliatory murder of a member of the immediate family of law 
enforcement officials. 
18 U.S. 
C. 241, 242, 245, 247 
Civil rights offenses resulting in death. 
18 U.S.C. 351 
[by cross-reference to 18 
U.S.C. 1111] 
Murder of a member of Congress, an important executive official, 
or a Supreme Court Justice. 
18 U.S.C. 794   Espionage. 
18 U.S.C. 844(d), (f), (i)  Death resulting from offenses involving transportation of 
explosives, destruction of government property, or destruction of 
property related to foreign or interstate commerce. 
18 U.S.C. 924(i)  Murder committed by the use of a firearm during a crime of 
violence or a drug-trafficking crime. 
18 U.S.C. 930   Murder committed in a Federal Government facility. 
18 U.S.C. 1091   Genocide. 
18 U.S.C. 1111   First-degree murder. 
18 U.S.C. 1114   Murder of a Federal judge or law enforcement official. 
18 U.S.C. 1116   Murder of a foreign official. 
18 U.S.C. 1118  Murder by a Federal prisoner. 
18 U.S.C. 1119   Murder of a U.S. national in a foreign country. 
18 U.S.C. 1120  Murder by an escaped Federal prisoner already sentenced to life 
imprisonment. 
18 U.S.C. 1121  Murder of a State or local law enforcement official or other person 
aiding in a Federal investigation; murder of a State correctional 
officer. 
18 U.S.C. 1201   Murder during a kidnapping. 
18 U.S.C. 1203  Murder during a hostage taking. 
18 U.S.C. 1503   Murder of a court officer or juror. 
18 U.S.C. 1512  Murder with the intent of preventing testimony by a witness, 
victim, or informant. 
18 U.S.C. 1513  Retaliatory murder of a witness, victim, or informant. 
18 U.S.C. 1716   Mailing of injurious articles with intent to kill or resulting in death. 
18 U.S.C. 1751 
[by cross-reference to 18 
U.S.C. 1111] 
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Assassination or kidnapping resulting in the death of the President 
or Vice President. 
18 U.S.C. 1958   Murder for hire. 
18 U.S.C. 1959   Murder involved in a racketeering offense. 
18 U.S.C. 1992   Willful wrecking of a train resulting in death. 
18 U.S.C. 2113   Bank-robbery-related murder or kidnapping. 
18 U.S.C. 2119   Murder related to a carjacking. 
18 U.S.C. 2245   Murder related to rape or child molestation. 
18 U.S.C. 2251   Murder related to sexual exploitation of children. 
18 U.S.C. 2280   Murder committed during an offense against maritime navigation. 
18 U.S.C. 2281  Murder committed during an offense against a maritime fixed 
platform. 
18 U.S.C. 2332   Terrorist murder of a U.S. national in another country. 
18 U.S.C. 2332a   Murder by the use of a weapon of mass destruction. 
18 U.S.C. 2340   Murder involving torture. 
18 U.S.C. 2381   Treason. 
21 U.S.C. 848(e)  Murder related to a continuing criminal enterprise or related 
murder of a Federal, State, or local law enforcement officer. 
49 U.S.C. 1472-1473   Death resulting from aircraft hijacking. 
 
Source: National Prisoner Statistics Program (NPS-8). 
See also Methodology. 
 
 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics  
 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/cp/2007/cp07st.pdf 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix M 
Bureau of Justice Statistics: Table-Demographic characteristics of prisoners 
 
 
Prisoners under sentence of death, 2007 
 
Characteristic   Yearend   Admissions    Removals 
Total inmates   3,220    115 1    28 
 
Gender 
Male     98.3%    98.3%    99.2% 
Female    1.7    1.7     0.8 
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Race 
White     56.0%    58.3%     53.9% 
Black     41.8    40.9     43.0 
All other races* 2.2 0.9 3.1 
 
Hispanic origin 
Hispanic    12.9%    14.4%     9.5% 
Non-Hispanic   87.1    85.6     90.5 
Number unknown   413   1     12 
 
Education 
8th grade or less   13.8%    7.9%     13.9% 
9th-11th grade   36.7    36.5     43.5 
High school graduate/GED 40.4    44.4     36.1 
Any college    9.2    11.1     6.5 
Median    11th    12th     11th 
Number unknown   522    52     20 
 
Marital status 
Married    22.2%   29.9%     20.4% 
Divorced/separated   20.4    14.9     16.8 
Widowed    2.8    2.3     5.3 
Never married   54.5    52.9     57.5 
Number unknown   362    28     15 
 
Note: Calculations are based on those cases for which data were reported. Detail may not add to 
total due to rounding. 
 
*At yearend 2006, inmates of "other" races consisted of 28 American Indians, 35 Asians, and 11 
self identified Hispanics. During 2007, 1 Asian was admitted; and 2 American Indians, 1 Asian, 
and 1 self identified Hispanic were removed. 
Source: National Prisoner Statistics Program (NPS-8). See also Methodology. 
 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics  
 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/cp/2007/cp07st.pdf 
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Appendix N 
Bureau of Justice Statistics: Table-Number of persons executed by jurisdiction 1930-2007 
 
Capital Punishment, 2007 - Statistical Tables 
 
Table 9. Number of persons executed, by jurisdiction, 1930-2007 
 
Number executed 
Jurisdiction       Since 1930   Since 1977 
 
U.S. total      4,958    1,099 
 
Texas        702    405 
Georgia       406    40 
New York       329    0 
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North Carolina      306    43 
California       305    13 
Florida      234    64 
South Carolina      199   37 
Ohio        198    26 
Virginia      190    98 
Alabama       173    38 
Mississippi       162    8 
Louisiana       160    27 
Pennsylvania      155    3 
Oklahoma       146    86 
Arkansas       145   27 
Missouri       128    66 
Kentucky       105   2 
Illinois       102    12 
Tennessee       97    4 
New Jersey       74   0 
Maryland      73    5 
Arizona      61    23 
Indiana      60    19 
Washington       51    4 
Colorado      48    1 
Nevada       41    12 
District of Columbia     40    0 
West Virginia      40   0 
Federal system      36   3 
Massachusetts      27    0 
Delaware      26    14 
Connecticut       22    1 
Oregon       21    2 
Utah        19    6 
Iowa        18    0 
Kansas       15    0 
Montana       9    3 
New Mexico      9    1 
Wyoming       8    1 
Nebraska       7    3 
Vermont      4    0 
Idaho        4    1 
South Dakota      2    1 
New Hampshire      1    0 
Note: Military authorities carried out an additional 160 executions between 1930 and 1961. 
Source: National Prisoner Statistics Program (NPS-8). 
See also Methodology. 
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Source: U.S. Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics  
 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/cp/2007/cp07st.pdf 
 
Appendix O 
Bureau of Justice Statistics: Table-Age at time of arrest for capital offense 
 
Capital Punishment, 2007 - Statistical Tables 
 
Table 7. Age at time of arrest for capital offense and age of prisoners under sentence of 
death at yearend 2007 
 
Prisoners under sentence of death 
 
At time of arrest   On December 31, 2007 
Age      Number* Percent  Number  Percent 
Total number under sentence 
of death on 12/31/07    2,955   100 %   3,220   100 % 
 
19 or younger    317   10.7   1   -- 
20-24      812   27.5   42   1.3 
25-29      677   22.9   249  7.7 
30-34      508   17.2   431   13.4 
35-39      321   10.9   574   17.8 
40-44     172   5.8   546   17.0 
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45-49      88   3.0   583   18.1 
50-54      34   1.2   357   11.1 
55-59     19   0.6   250  7.8 
60-64      5   0.2   127   3.9 
65 or older     2   0.1   60   1.9 
Mean age    29 yrs.    43 yrs. 
Median age    27 yrs.    42 yrs. 
 
-- Less than .05% 
Note: The youngest person under sentence of death was a black male in Texas, born in June 1988 
and sentenced to death in June 2007. The oldest person under sentence of death was a white male 
in Arizona, born in September 1915 and sentenced to death in June 1983. 
*Excludes 265 inmates for whom the date of arrest for capital offense was not available. 
Source: National Prisoner Statistics Program (NPS-8). See also Methodology. 
 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics  
 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/cp/2007/cp07st.pdf 
 
Appendix P 
 
Bureau of Justice Statistics: Table-Number of persons executed by race, Hispanic origin, and 
method 
 
 
Capital Punishment, 2007 - Statistical Tables 
  
Table 16. Number of persons executed by race, Hispanic origin, and method, 1977-2007 
 
Number of persons executed    
 American 
Method of execution  White*  Black*  Hispanic   Indian* Asian* 
 
Total    631   373   81   8   6 
 
Lethal injection   536   301   79   7   6 
Electrocution    82   69   2   1    
Lethal gas    8   3   0   0   0 
Hanging    3   0   0   0   0 
Firing squad    2   0   0   0             0 
 
*Excludes persons of Hispanic origin. 
Source: National Prisoner Statistics. See also Methodology 
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Source: U.S. Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics  
 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/cp/2007/cp07st.pdf 
Appendix Q 
Bureau of Justice Statistics: Table-Number of Persons Executed 1977-2007 
Capital Punishment, 2007 - Statistical Tables 
 
Table 15. Number of persons executed, 1977-2007 
 
Year      Number executed 
 
1977       1 
1979       2 
1981       1 
1982        2 
1983        5 
1984       21 
1985       18 
1986       18 
1987       25 
1988      11 
1989       16 
1990      23 
1991                 14 
1992       31 
1993       38 
1994      31 
1995       56 
1996      45 
1997      74 
1998       68 
1999       98 
2000       85 
2001       66 
2002      71 
2003       65 
2004       59 
2005       60 
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2006       53 
2007                 42 
 
Source: National Prisoner Statistics Program (NPS-8). 
See also Methodology 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics  
 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/cp/2007/cp07st.pdf 
Appendix R 
Information about Justices Who Authored Important Majority Opinions 
 
Justice Stewart Potter: Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 
 
Associate Justice 
State Appointed From: Ohio 
Appointed by President Eisenhower 
Judicial Oath Taken: October 14, 1958 
Date Service Terminated: July 3, 1981 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr: McClesky v. Kempp (1987) 
Associate Justice 
State Appointed From: Virginia 
Appointed by President Nixon 
Judicial Oath Taken: January 7, 1972 
Date Service Terminated: June 26, 1987 
 
 
 
 
Justice John Paul Stevens: Atkins v. Virginia (2002) 
Associate Justice 
State Appointed From: Illinois 
Appointed by President Ford 
Judicial Oath Taken: December 19, 1975 
Date Service Terminated: June 29, 2010 
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy: Roper 
v. Simmons (2005) 
Associate Justice 
State Appointed From: California 
Appointed by President Reagan 
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Judicial Oath Taken: February 18, 1988 
Current 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice John J. Roberts Jr: Baze v. Rees (2008) 
Chief Justice 
State Appointed From: Maryland 
Appointed by President Bush, G. W. 
Judicial Oath Taken: September 29, 2005 
Current 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: U.S. Supreme Court. Members of the Supreme Court of the United States.  
 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx 
 
 
Appendix S 
Information about Justices Who Authored Major Dissenting Opinions 
 
Chief Justice Warren Earl Burger: Furman v. Georgia (1972) 
Chief Justice 
State Appointed From: Virginia 
Appointed by President Nixon 
Judicial Oath Taken: June 23, 1969 
Date Service Terminated: September 26, 1986 
 
 
 
 
Justice Thurgood Marshall: 
Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 
Associate Justice 
State Appointed From: New York 
Appointed by President Johnson, L. 
Judicial Oath Taken: October 2, 
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1967 
Date Service Terminated: October 1, 1991 
 
 
 
 
Justice Harry A. Blackmun: McClesky v. Kempp (1987) 
Associate Justice 
State Appointed From: Minnesota 
Appointed by President Nixon 
Judicial Oath Taken: June 9, 1970 
Date Service Terminated: August 3, 1994 
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist: Atkins v. Virginia (2002) 
Chief Justice 
State Appointed From: Virginia 
Appointed by President Reagan 
Judicial Oath Taken: September 26, 1986 
Date Service Terminated: September 3, 2005 
 
Associate Justice (Elevated) 
State Appointed From: Virginia 
Appointed by President Nixon 
Judicial Oath Taken: January 7, 1972 
Date Service Terminated: September 26, 1986 
 
Justice Antonin Scalia: Atkins v. Virginia (2002) 
Associate Justice State Appointed From: Virginia 
Appointed by President Reagan 
Judicial Oath Taken: September 26, 1986 
Current 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor: Roper v. Simmons 
(2005) 
Associate Justice 
State Appointed From: Arizona 
Appointed by President Reagan 
Judicial Oath Taken: September 25, 1981 
Date Service Terminated: January 31, 2006 
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Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: Baze v. Rees (2008) 
Associate Justice 
State Appointed From: New York 
Appointed by President Clinton 
Judicial Oath Taken: August 10, 1993 
Current 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: U.S. Supreme Court. Members of the Supreme Court of the United States.  
 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix T 
Number of Executions by State Since 1976 
Population divided by # executed, 2010 Census figures 
 
Total  2010  2009  Ratio*    Total  2010  2009 Ratio 
 
Texas   464  17  24 1/1,000,000 Illinois  12  0  0 
Virginia  108 3  3  1/2,600,000 Nevada  12  0  0 
Oklahoma  93  2  3  1/1,000,000 Utah   7  1 0 
Florida  69 1  2  1/9,000,000 Tennessee 6  0  2  1/3,000,000 
Missouri 67 0  1  1/6,000,000 Maryland  5  0  0 
Georgia 48  2  3  1/3,000,000 Washington  5  1  0 
Alabama  49  5 6  1/780,000 Nebraska  3 0  0 
N. Carolina  43 0  0   Pennsylvania  3  0 0 
S. Carolina 42  0  2 1/2,000,000 Kentucky  3  0 0 
Ohio   41 8  5 1/2,000,000 Montana  3  0  0 
Louisiana  28 1  0    Oregon  2  0  0 
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Arkansas  27 0  0    Connecticut  1  0 0 
Arizona  24 1  0    Idaho   1  0 0 
Indiana  20 0  1  1/6,000,000 New Mexico  1  0  0 
Delaware  14 0  0    Colorado  1  0  0 
California 13 0  0   Wyoming  1  0  0 
Mississippi  13  3  0    South Dakota  1 0  0 
US Gov’t  3 0  0 
 
*Ratios are approximate, calculated using 2009 execution figures 
 
Source: Death Penalty Information Center. http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/united-states- 
supreme-court-decisions-1972-1996 
2010 Census. State Population and the Distribution of Electoral Votes and Representatives.  
http://www.thegreenpapers.com/Census10/HouseAndElectors.phtml 
 
 
 
Appendix U 
Chart: Global Death Penalty Use in 2009 
 
The death penalty in 2009 
More than two-thirds of the countries of the world have abolished the death penalty in law or in 
practice. While 58 countries retained the death penalty in 2009, most did not use it. Eighteen 
countries were known to have carried out executions, killing a total of at least 714 people; 
however, this figure does not include the thousands of executions that were likely to have taken 
place in China, which again refused to divulge figures on its use of the death penalty. 
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Methods of execution in 2009 included hanging, shooting, beheading, stoning, electrocution and 
lethal injection. 
Death sentences and executions 2009 
Where "+" is indicated after a country and it is preceded by a number, it means that the figure 
Amnesty International has calculated is a minimum figure. Where "+" is indicated after a country 
and is not preceded by a number, it indicates that there were executions or death sentences (at 
least more than one) in that country but it was not possible to calculate a figure. 
Source: Amnesty International. The Death Penalty in 2009. http://www.amnesty.org/en/death- 
penalty/death-sentences-and-executions-in-2009 
Appendix V 
Death Penalty Public Opinion Polls 
 
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2003, page 146 
 
Table 2.53   
Attitudes toward the death penalty for murder for selected groups 
United States, 2002     
Question:  “Do you favor the death penalty for…?”                                                                                                               
Favor   Oppose  Don't know/refused 
 
Women    68%   29%    3% 
Juveniles     26  69    5 
The mentally retarded  13   82    5 
The mentally ill   19   75    6 
 
 
Note: These data are based on telephone interviews with a randomly selected national 
sample of 1,012 adults, 18 years of age and older, conducted May 6-9, 2002. For a discussion of 
public opinion survey sampling procedures, see Appendix 5. 
 
Source: The Gallup Organization, Inc., The Gallup Poll [Online]. Available: 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr020520.asp [May 23, 2002]. Reprinted by permission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t200372010.pdf 
 
Table 2.0037.2010 
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Attitudes toward the death penalty for persons convicted of murder 
 
By politics and religious affiliation, United States, 2010a 
Question: "Do you strongly favor, favor, oppose, or strongly oppose the death penalty for 
persons convicted of murder?" 
 
     Favor   Oppose  Don't know/refused 
 
Total      62%   30%   9% 
 
Politics 
Republican     78   16  7 
Democrat     50   42   7 
Independent     62  30   8 
 
Religion 
Protestant     65   26   9 
White evangelical   74   19   7 
White mainline   71   21   8 
Black Protestant   37   49   14 
Catholic     60   32   8 
White Catholic  68   26  6 
Hispanic Catholic   43   45   13 
Unaffiliated    61   32   6 
 
Note: These data are based on telephone interviews with a randomly selected national sample 
of 3,003 adults, 18 years of age and older, conducted July 21-Aug. 5, 2010. For a discussion 
of public opinion survey sampling procedures, see Appendix 5. 
 
aPercents may not add to 100 because of rounding. 
 
Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press and Pew Forum on Religion & Public 
Life. Few Say Religion Shapes Immigration, Environment Views: Religion and the Issues 
(Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, Sept. 17, 2010), pp. 15, 25. Table 
adapted by SOURCEBOOK staff. Reprinted by permission. 
 
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics.  
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/tost_2.html#2_ab 
Appendix W 
Pro-Death Penalty Organizations 
 
Citizens Against Homicide 
A non-profit, public benefits organization serving families and friends of homicide victims 
Clark County Indiana Prosecuting Attorney 
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Steven D. Stewart, Prosecuting Attorney for Clark County, Indiana, has established this web site 
with information on Indiana's death penalty and an extensive listing of death penalty-related web 
sites. 
Justice For All 
A Texas-based not-for-profit advocating for criminal justice reform with an emphasis on victim 
rights. Justice for All is a strong advocate of the death penalty, and has established a separate 
site, Prodeathpenalty.com, dedicated to pro-death penalty information and resources. It has also 
established Murdervictims.com for survivors of victims of homicide. 
Pro-Death Penalty.com 
A resource for pro-death penalty information and resources. Includes case info on upcoming 
executions, a collection of death penalty links, and current news. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: University of Alaska Anchorage Justice Center. Death Penalty Organizations & Sites,  
Pro & Con. http://justice.uaa.alaska.edu/death/procon.html 
 
 
Appendix X 
Anti-Death Penalty Organizations 
 
ACLU Death Penalty Campaign 
The American Civil Liberties Union considers the death penalty to be unconstitutional under the 
Eight Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and that its discriminatory application violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
American Bar Association Death Penalty Moratorium Implementation Project 
The Project will work toward achieving a national moratorium on executions until the death 
penalty process is reformed (Filed an amicus curiae* brief in Roper v. Simmons). 
Amnesty International Website Against the Death Penalty 
Amnesty International is a well-known international human rights organization based in London, 
with chapters throughout the world. It has an ongoing worldwide anti-death penalty campaign 
and issues reports on the death penalty in a number of countries, including the U.S. 
Campaign to End the Death Penalty 
A national grassroots organization dedicated to the abolition of capital punishment. 
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Citizens United for Alternatives to the Death Penalty (CUADP) 
An organization promoting viable alternatives to the death penalty and heightened visibility for 
those who seek better public policy in response to violent crime.  
Coalition for Juvenile Justice 
A representative national nonprofit organization: to give voice to state-identified concerns and 
needs in juvenile justice; to advise state and federal policy makers and the federal Office of 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention; and to generate ongoing collegial support and 
information exchange (Also filed an amicus curiae brief in Roper v. Simmons) 
Death Watch International  
Organization based in the UK exploring the issue of the death penalty on a global scale. Their 
comprehensive website contains stories, news and factual information on the status of the death 
penalty around the world. 
 
 
The Innocence Project 
A national litigation and public policy organization dedicated to exonerating wrongfully 
convicted people through DNA testing and reforming the criminal justice system to prevent 
further injustice. 
The Moratorium Campaign  
Works towards obtaining a moratorium on the death penalty, educating the public, and collects 
signatures for a petition that will be delivered to the United States representatives to the United 
Nations on Human Rights Day. 
Murder Victims Families for Reconciliation 
Abolitionist organization comprising relatives of homicide victims. "MVFR knows that - in spite 
of that pain - vengeance is not the answer. The taking of another life by state killing only 
continues the cycle of violence." 
National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty 
A nationwide coalition of nearly 150 national, state, and local organizations working toward the 
abolition of capital punishment. 
Physicians for Human Rights 
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Physicians for Human Rights mobilizes health professionals to advance health, dignity and 
justice, and promotes the right to health for all. 
Students Against the Death Penalty  
A student-run organization that mobilizes youth through education and advocacy. 
World Coalition Against the Death Penalty 
The World Coalition Against the Death Penalty brings together all those committed to the 
universal abolition of capital punishment. Aims to strengthen the international dimension of the 
struggle against capital punishment. 
 Unitarian Universalists for Alternatives to the Death Penalty  
A social action group seeking an end to the death penalty  
 
 
*Or “friend of the court” brief. Filed in the Supreme Court by parties not directly involved in a 
particular case but that has an interest in the issue before the Court. 
 
 
Source: University of Alaska Anchorage Justice Center. Death Penalty Organizations & Sites,  
Pro & Con. http://justice.uaa.alaska.edu/death/procon.html 
Death Penalty Information Center. http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/united-states- 
supreme-court-decisions-1972-1996 
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Appendix Y 
Executions Prior to 1972 by State 
 
State608-1976    Executions 1608-1976 
Virginia       1,227 
New York       1,130 
Pennsylvania       1,040 
Georgia       950  
North Carolina      784  
Texas        755 
 California       709  
Alabama       708  
South Carolina      641 
 Louisiana       632  
Arkansas       478  
Ohio        438  
Kentucky       424 
New Jersey       361  
Mississippi       351  
Illinois        348  
Massachusetts       345  
Tennessee       335  
Florida        314  
Maryland       309  
Missouri       285  
West Virginia       155 
 Oklahoma       132  
Indiana       131  
Connecticut       126  
Oregon       122  
Washington, DC      118  
Washington       105  
Arizona       104  
Colorado       101 
 New Mexico       73 
 Montana       71 
 Minnesota       66  
Delaware       62  
Nevada       61  
Kansas        57  
Rhode Island       52  
Hawaii        49  
Iowa        45  
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Utah        43  
Nebraska       34 
 Idaho        26  
Vermont       26  
New Hampshire      24  
Wyoming       22  
Maine        21 
 South Dakota       15 
 Michigan       13  
Alaska        12  
North Dakota       8  
Wisconsin       1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Death Penalty Information Center. http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/united-states- 
supreme-court-decisions-1972-1996 
 
Appendix Z 
Executions Prior to 1972 by Year 
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Source: Death Penalty Information Center. http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-us-1608- 
2002-espy-file 
 
 
Appendix AA 
Executions Prior to 1972 by Race 
Race Espy File 1608 - 1972 DPIC 1976 - 2007* 
White 41% (5,902) 57% (621) 
Black 49% (7,084) 34% (367) 
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Source: Death Penalty Information Center. http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-us-1608- 
2002-espy-file 
 
 
 
Appendix BB 
Founders’ Thoughts on Capital Punishment 
 
Thomas Jefferson: “Punishments I know are necessary, and I would provide them strict and 
inflexible, but proportioned to the crime. Death might be inflicted for murder and perhaps for 
treason, [but I] would take out of the description of treason all crimes which are not such in 
their nature. Rape, buggery, etc., punish by castration. All other crimes by working on high 
roads, rivers, gallies, etc., a certain time proportioned to the offence. . . . Laws thus 
proportionate and mild should never be dispensed with. Let mercy be the character of the 
lawgiver, but let the judge be a mere machine. The mercies of the law will be dispensed equally 
and impartially to every description of men; those of the judge or of the executive power will be 
the eccentric impulses of whimsical, capricious designing man.” 
Alexander Hamilton: was opposed capital punishment as “extreme severity” 
James Madison: “I should not regret a fair and full trial of the entire abolition of capital 
punishment.” 
Benjamin Franklin: “That it is better [one hundred] guilty persons should escape than that one 
innocent person should suffer.” 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Koellhoffer, Tara. Thomas Jefferson. Current Events, In His Own Words, If He  
Native American 2% (353) 1% (15) 
Hispanic 2% (295) 7% (75) 
Other (includes Asian Pacific Islander and unknown) 6% (855) 1%(9) 
Total Executions 14,489 1087 
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Blogged… 3 Jan 2007. 
http://thomasjefferson.worldhistoryblogs.com/2007/01/03/on-the-punishment-
fitting-the-crime/ 
 Andrews, F. The writings of George Washington: being his correspondence, addresses,  
messages, and other papers, official and private, Volume 5. 1837. 
http://books.google.com/books?id=c8EKAQAAIAAJ&pg=PA13&lpg=PA13&dq
=George+washington+and+capital+punishment&source=bl&ots=9x-
QNUDUsV&sig=Mc9kzpvMlv3oNhhNDK0F4wypDyg&hl=en&ei=EE3xTNmX
GKTvnQfthdybCg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0CCcQ6
AEwAw#v=onepage&q&f=false 
http://socyberty.com/law/the-death-penalty-2/#ixzz16d8j9nb5 
http://books.google.com/books?id=ip0eaOoVWWIC&pg=PA263&lpg=PA263&dq=Alexander+
Hamilton+on+capital+punishment&source=bl&ots=g-
PlGSfZ1H&sig=SyR31nEAy3FosqSWZgR1QNZcikU&hl=en&ei=z0L1TMUmwq3wBpzAqfE
G&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0CCcQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=Alexan
der%20Hamilton%20on%20capital%20punishment&f=false 
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Appendix CC 
Reports on Cruelty of Certain Execution Methods 
 
Excerpt from Human Rights Watch Report, So Long as They Die: Lethal Injections in the United 
States (April 24, 2006). 
 Although supporters of lethal injection believe 
the prisoner dies painlessly, there is mounting 
evidence that prisoners may have experienced 
excruciating pain during their executions. This 
should not be surprising given that corrections 
agencies have not taken the steps necessary to 
ensure a painless execution. They use a sequence 
of drugs and a method of administration that were 
created with minimal expertise and little 
deliberation three decades ago, and that were then 
adopted unquestioningly by state officials with no 
medical or scientific background. Little has 
changed since then. As a result, prisoners in the 
United States are executed by means that the 
American Veterinary Medical Association regards 
as too cruel to use on dogs and cats. (Part IV, 
footnotes omitted). 
Human rights law is predicated on recognition of 
the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable 
rights of all people, including even those who have committed terrible crimes. It prohibits torture 
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment. Human Rights Watch believes these rights 
cannot be reconciled with the death penalty, a form of punishment unique in its cruelty and 
finality, and a punishment inevitably and universally plagued with arbitrariness, prejudice, and 
error. Thus our first recommendation is that states and the federal government abolish the death 
penalty. If governments do not choose to abolish capital punishment, they must still heed human 
rights principles by ensuring their execution methods are chosen and administered to minimize 
the risk a condemned prisoner will experience pain and suffering. As state lethal injection 
protocols have never been subjected to serious medical and scientific scrutiny, Human Rights 
Watch recommends that each state suspends its lethal injection executions until it has convened a 
panel of anesthesiologists, pharmacologists, doctors, corrections officials, prosecutors, defense 
attorneys, and judges to determine whether or not its lethal injection executions as currently 
practiced are indeed the most humane form of execution. (Recommendations). 
Source:  Death Penalty Information Center.  http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/1711 
THE DEATH PENALTY V. HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Why Abolish the Death Penalty? (1)  
September 2007 
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Amnesty International 
 
The time has come to abolish the death penalty worldwide. The case for abolition becomes more 
compelling with each passing year. Everywhere experience shows that executions brutalize those 
involved in the process. Nowhere has it been shown that the death penalty has any special power 
to reduce crime or political violence. In country after country, it is used disproportionately 
against the poor or against racial or ethnic minorities. It is also used as a tool of political 
repression. It is imposed and inflicted arbitrary. It is an irrevocable punishment, resulting 
inevitably in the execution of people innocent of any crime. It is a violation of fundamental 
human rights.  
 
Over the past decade an average of at least three countries a year have abolished the death 
penalty, affirming respect for human life and dignity.(2) Yet too many governments still believe 
that they can solve urgent social or political problems by executing a few or even hundreds of 
their prisoners. Too many citizens in too many countries are still unaware that the death penalty 
offers society not further protection but further brutalization. Abolition is gaining ground, but not 
fast enough.  
 
The death penalty, carried out in the name of the nation's entire population, involves everyone. 
Everyone should be aware of what the death penalty is, how it is used, how it affects them, how 
it violates fundamental rights.  
 
The death penalty is the premeditated and cold-blooded killing of a human being by the state. 
The state can exercise no greater power over a person than that of deliberately depriving him or 
her of life. At the heart of the case for abolition, therefore, is the question of whether the state has 
the right to do so.  
 
When the world's nations came together six decades ago to found the United Nations (UN), few 
reminders were needed of what could happen when a state believed that there was no limit to 
what it might do to a human being. The staggering extent of state brutality and terror during 
World War II and the consequences for people throughout the world were still unfolding in 
December 1948, when the UN General Assembly adopted without dissent the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.  
 
The Universal Declaration is a pledge among nations to promote fundamental rights as the 
foundation of freedom, justice and peace. The rights it proclaims are inherent in every human 
being. They are not privileges that may be granted by governments for good behaviour and they 
may not be withdrawn for bad behaviour. Fundamental human rights limit what a state may do to 
a man, woman or child.  
 
No matter what reason a government gives for executing prisoners and what method of execution 
is used, the death penalty cannot be separated from the issue of human rights. The movement for 
abolition cannot be separated from the movement for human rights.  
 
The Universal Declaration recognizes each person's right to life and categorically states further 
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that "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment". In Amnesty International's view the death penalty violates these rights.  
 
Self-defence may be held to justify, in some cases, the taking of life by state officials: for 
example, when a country is locked in warfare (international or civil) or when law-enforcement 
officials must act immediately to save their own lives or those of others. Even in such situations 
the use of lethal force is surrounded by internationally accepted legal safeguards to inhibit abuse. 
This use of force is aimed at countering the immediate damage resulting from force used by 
others.  
 
The death penalty, however, is not an act of self-defence against an immediate threat to life. It is 
the premeditated killing of a prisoner who could be dealt with equally well by less harsh means.  
 
There can never be a justification for torture or for cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or 
punishment. The cruelty of the death penalty is evident. Like torture, an execution constitutes an 
extreme physical and mental assault on a person already rendered helpless by government 
authorities.  
 
If hanging a woman by her arms until she experiences excruciating pain is rightly condemned as 
torture, how does one describe hanging her by the neck until she is dead? If administering 100 
volts of electricity to the most sensitive parts of a man's body evokes disgust, what is the 
appropriate reaction to the administration of 2,000 volts to his body in order to kill him? If a 
pistol held to the head or a chemical substance injected to cause protracted suffering are clearly 
instruments of torture, how should they be identified when used to kill by shooting or lethal 
injection? Does the use of legal process in these cruelties make their inhumanity justifiable?  
 
The physical pain caused by the action of killing a human being cannot be quantified. Nor can 
the psychological suffering caused by fore-knowledge of death at the hands of the state. Whether 
a death sentence is carried out six minutes after a summary trial, six weeks after a mass trial or 
16 years after lengthy legal proceedings, the person executed is subjected to uniquely cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment.  
 
Internationally agreed laws and standards stipulate that the death penalty can only be used after a 
fair judicial process. When a state convicts prisoners without affording them a fair trial, it denies 
the right to due process and equality before the law. The irrevocable punishment of death 
removes not only the victim's right to seek redress for wrongful conviction, but also the judicial 
system's capacity to correct its errors.  
 
Like killings which take place outside the law, the death penalty denies the value of human life. 
By violating the right to life, it removes the foundation for realization of all rights enshrined in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
 
As the Human Rights Committee set up under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights has recognized, "The right to life...is the supreme right from which no derogation is 
permitted even in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation..." In a general 
comment on Article 6 of the Covenant issued in 1982, the Committee concluded that "all 
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measures of abolition [of the death penalty] should be considered as progress in the enjoyment of 
the right to life within the meaning of Article 40".  
Many governments have recognized that the death penalty cannot be reconciled with respect for 
human rights. The UN has declared itself in favour abolition. Two-thirds of the countries in the 
world have now abolished the death penalty in law or practice. 
Amnesty International's latest information shows that(3):  
· 90 countries and territories have abolished the death penalty for all crimes;  
· 11 countries have abolished the death penalty for all but exceptional crimes such as wartime 
crimes;  
· 30 countries can be considered abolitionist in practice: they retain the death penalty in law but 
have not carried out any executions for the past 10 years or more and are believed to have a 
policy or established practice of not carrying out executions,  
· a total of 131 countries have abolished the death penalty in law or practice,  
· 66 other countries and territories retain and use the death penalty, but the number of countries 
which actually execute prisoners in any one year is much smaller. 
Amnesty International' statistics also show a significant overall decline in the number of reported 
executions in 2006. In 2006, 91% of all known executions took place in a small number of 
countries: China, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Sudan and the USA. Europe is almost a death penalty-free-
zone -- the main exception being Belarus; in Africa only six states carried out executions in 
2006; in the Americas only the USA has carried out executions since 2003.  
Unlike torture, "disappearances" and extrajudicial executions, most judicial executions are not 
carried out in secret or denied by government authorities. Executions are often announced in 
advance. In some countries they are carried out in public or before a group of invited observers.  
 
No government publicly admits to torture or other grave violations of human rights, although 
privately some officials may seek to justify such abuses in the name of the "greater good". But 
retentionist governments, those that keep the death penalty, for the most part openly admit to 
using it: they do not so much deny its cruelty as attempt to justify its use; and the arguments they 
use publicly to justify the death penalty resemble those that are used in private to justify other, 
secret abuses.  
 
The most common justification offered is that, terrible as it is, the death penalty is necessary: it 
may be necessary only temporarily, but, it is argued, only the death penalty can meet a particular 
need of society. And whatever that need may be it is claimed to be so great that it justifies the 
cruel punishment of death.  
 
The particular needs claimed to be served by the death penalty differ from time to time and from 
society to society. In some countries the penalty is considered legitimate as a means of 
preventing or punishing the crime of murder. Elsewhere it may be deemed indispensable to stop 
drug-trafficking, acts of political terror, economic corruption or adultery. In yet other countries, 
it is used to eliminate those seen as posing a political threat to the authorities.  
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Once one state uses the death penalty for any reason, it becomes easier for other states to use it 
with an appearance of legitimacy for whatever reasons they may choose. If the death penalty can 
be justified for one offence, justifications that accord with the prevailing view of a society or its 
rulers will be found for it to be used for other offences. Whatever purpose is cited, the idea that a 
government can justify a punishment as cruel as death conflicts with the very concept of human 
rights. The significance of human rights is precisely that some means may never be used to 
protect society because their use violates the very values which make society worth protecting. 
When this essential distinction between appropriate and inappropriate mean is set aside in the 
name of some "greater good", all rights are vulnerable and all individuals are threatened.  
 
The death penalty, as a violation of fundamental human rights, would be wrong even if it could 
be shown that it uniquely met a vital social need. What makes the use of the death penalty even 
more indefensible and the case for its abolition even more compelling is that it has never been 
shown to have any special power to meet any genuine social need.  
 
Countless men and women have been executed for the stated purpose of preventing crime, 
especially the crime of murder. Yet Amnesty International has failed to find convincing evidence 
that the death penalty has any unique capacity to deter others from commuting particular crimes. 
A survey of research findings on the relation between the death penalty and homicide rates, 
conducted for the UN in 1988 and updated in 2002, concluded: ". . .it is not prudent to accept the 
hypothesis that capital punishment deters murder to a marginally greater extent than does the 
threat and application of the supposedly lesser punishment of life imprisonment."(4)  
 
Undeniably the death penalty, by permanently "incapacitating" a prisoner, prevents that person 
from repeating the crime. But there is no way to be sure that the prisoner would indeed have 
repeated the crime if allowed to live, nor is there any need to violate the prisoner's right to life for 
the purpose of incapacitation: dangerous offenders can be kept safely away from the public 
without resorting to execution, as shown by the experience of many abolitionist countries.  
 
Nor is there evidence that the threat of the death penalty will prevent politically motivated crimes 
or acts of terror. If anything, the possibility of political martyrdom through execution may 
encourage people to commit such crimes.  
 
Every society seeks protection from crimes. Far from being a solution, the death penalty gives 
the erroneous impression that "firm measures" are being taken against crime. It diverts attention 
from the more complex measures which are really needed. In the words of the South African 
Constitution Court in 1995, "We would be deluding ourselves if we were to believe that the 
execution of...a comparatively few people each year...will provide the solution to the 
unacceptably high rate of crime...The greatest deterrent to crime is the likelihood that offenders 
will be apprehended, convicted and punished". 
 
When the arguments of deterrence and incapacitation fall away, one is left with a more deep-
seated justification for the death penalty: that of just retribution for the particular crime 
committed. According to this argument, certain people deserve to be killed as repayment for the 
evil done: there are crimes so offensive that killing the offender is the only just response.  
Paone 82 
 
 
It is an emotionally powerful argument. It is also one which, if valid, would invalidate the basis 
for human rights. If a person who commits a terrible act can "deserve" the cruelty of death, why 
cannot others, for similar reasons, "deserve" to be tortured or imprisoned without trial or simply 
shot on sight? Central to fundamental human rights is that they are inalienable. They may not be 
taken away even if a person has committed the most atrocious of crimes. Human rights apply to 
the worst of us as well as to the best of us, which is why they protect all of us.  
 
What the argument for retribution boils down to, is often no more than a desire for vengeance 
masked as a principle of justice. The desire for vengeance can be understood and acknowledged 
but the exercise of vengeance must be resisted. The history of the endeavour to establish the rule 
of law is a history of the progressive restriction of personal vengeance in public policy and legal 
codes.  
 
If today's penal systems do not sanction the burning of an arsonist's home, the rape of the rapist 
or the torture of the torturer, it is not because they tolerate the crimes. Instead, it is because 
societies understand that they must be built on a different set of values from those they condemn.  
 
An execution cannot be used to condemn killing; it is killing. Such an act by the state is the 
mirror image of the criminal's willingness to use physical violence against a victim.  
 
Related to the argument that some people "deserve" to die is the proposition that the state is 
capable of determining exactly who they are. Whatever one's view of the retribution argument 
may be, the practice of the death penalty reveals that no criminal justice system is, or 
conceivably could be, capable of deciding fairly, consistently and infallibly who should live and 
who should die.  
 
All criminal justice systems are vulnerable to discrimination and error. Expediency, discretionary 
decisions and prevailing public opinion may influence the proceedings at every stage from the 
initial arrest to the last-minute decision clemency. The reality of the death penalty is that what 
determines who shall be executed and who shall be spared is often not only the nature of the 
crimes but also the ethnic and social background, the financial means or the political opinions of 
the defendant. The death penalty is used disproportionately against the poor, the powerless, the 
marginalised or those whom repressive governments deem it expedient to eliminate.  
 
Human uncertainty and arbitrary judgments are factors which affect all judicial decisions. But 
only one decision -- the decision to execute -- results in something that cannot be remedied or 
undone. Whether executions take place within hours of a summary trial or after years of 
protracted legal proceedings, states will continue to execute people who are later found to be 
innocent. Those executed cannot be compensated for loss of life and the whole society must 
share responsibility for what has been done.  
 
It is the irrevocable nature of the death penalty, the fact that the prisoner is eliminated forever, 
that makes the penalty so tempting to some states as a tool of repression. Thousands have been 
put to death under one government only to be recognized as innocent victims when another set of 
authorities comes to power. Only abolition can ensure that such political abuse of the death 
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penalty will never occur.  
 
When used to crush political dissent, the death penalty is abhorrent. When invoked as a way to 
protect society from crime, it is illusory. Wherever used, it brutalizes those involved in the 
process and conveys to the public a sense that killing a defenseless prisoner is somehow 
acceptable. It may be used to try to bolster the authority of the state -- or of those who govern in 
its name. But any such authority it confers is spurious. The penalty is a symbol of terror and, to 
that extent, a confession of weakness. It is always a violation of the most fundamental human 
rights.  
 
Each society and its citizens have the choice to decide about the sort of world people want and 
will work to achieve: a world in which the state is permitted to kill as a legal punishment or a 
world based on respect for human life and human rights -- a world without executions.  
 
Recommendations: 
 
Amnesty International calls on the UN General Assembly, 62nd session, (2007) to adopt a 
resolution: 
 
· Affirming the right to life and stating that abolition of the death penalty is essential for the 
protection of human rights; 
· Calling on retentionist states to establish a moratorium on executions as a first step towards 
abolition of the death penalty; 
· Calling on retentionist states to respect international standards that guarantee the protection of 
the rights of those facing the death penalty; and 
· Requesting the UN Secretary-General to report on the implementation of the moratorium to the 
next session of the UNGA. 
 
 
 
Source: Amnesty International.  
http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=ENGACT510022007&lang=e 
 
 
Appendix DD 
Pro-Death Penalty Article 
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Death Decisions  
By Michael Nevin (04/08/04)  
 
 
In 1965 Robert Lee Massie killed Mildred Weiss in San Gabriel, California while robbing her 
and her husband. He received the death penalty. However, in 1972 all the death sentences in 
California were commuted to life, so in 1978 Massie was paroled. On January 3, 1979 Robert 
Massie shot and killed San Francisco liquor store owner Boris Naumoff and wounded a store 
clerk during yet another robbery.[1]  
 
On February 6, 2001 San Francisco District Attorney Terrence Hallinan addressed a San 
Francisco court refusing to file a motion to set the execution date for Robert Lee Massie. 
Hallinan told the court, The death penalty does not constitute any more deterrent than life 
without parole.[2] Hallinan, a longtime and outspoken opponent of the death penalty, let his 
personal feelings outweigh his duty as a district attorney to carry out state law. The California 
State Attorney General’s office was forced to step in and set the date of execution. Although it 
was too late for one San Francisco liquor store owner, Massie faced the ultimate deterrent as fate 
would eventually catch up with him.  
 
Former Illinois Governor George Ryan, who commuted the death sentences of all 167 Illinois 
inmates in 2002, addressed the California Legislature last year saying, I don’t know what’s 
wrong with calling a delay for a couple years.[3] Ryan, who is under federal indictment for 
taking payoffs while Illinois Secretary of State, was nominated for the 2003 Nobel Peace Prize 
for his efforts to stop the death penalty.[4] He joined illustrious company that includes California 
death row inmate and L.A. Crips street gang co-founder Stanley Tookie Williams. Williams, a 
convicted killer of four, was nominated twice for the same peace award.[5] I would suspect 
Mumia Abu-Jamal, honorary citizen of Paris and executioner of Philadelphia police officer 
Daniel Faulkner, would lend his support for Ryan’s nomination.  
 
Ryan called for a moratorium in California where only 10 people have been put to death since 
1977, although the state has sentenced 795 people to death between 1976 and 2002. Imperial 
County District Attorney Gilbert Otero stated, The state’s citizens can take solace in the 
extraordinary safeguards used to ensure that only those murderers who are most deserving 
receive the death penalty. There is no need whatsoever to impose a so-called moratorium in 
California. California limits the death penalty to first-degree murder with special circumstances, 
train wrecking, treason, or perjury causing execution. A Cornell University study released in 
March 2004 found that California has a death sentence rate of only 1.3% while the national 
average stood at 2.2%.[6]  
 
Several myths about the death penalty have been reported but continue to be debunked upon 
closer examination. The Liebman study at Columbia University, Broken System: Error Rates in 
Capital Cases, 1973-1995,released its results in 2000 claiming serious flaws in the system, 
including a high rate. It was later revealed that the misleading included any issue requiring 
further review by a lower court, even when the court upheld the sentence. The 23-year study 
found no cases of mistaken executions.[7] The numerous appeals in capital cases demonstrate the 
extraordinary adherence to due process. The fallacy that innocent people are being executed 
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cannot be validated, and it is intellectually dishonest for opponents of the death penalty to 
perpetrate this myth. The death penalty in America is undoubtedly one of the most accurately 
administered criminal justice procedures in the world.  
 
The issue of race has been cited by critics, who complain that minorities are unfairly chosen for 
death sentences. According to the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, since the death penalty was 
reinstated by the Supreme Court in 1976, white inmates have made up more than half of those 
under sentence of death. In 2002, 71 persons in 13 states were executed: 53 were white and 18 
were black. The Cornell University study found that African Americans represented 41.3% of 
condemned inmates while they committed 51.5% of homicides.[8]  
 
Upon closer examination, an issue can be made of the small number of executions compared to 
the number of people under sentence of death. According to the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
at yearend 2002, 37 states and the federal prison system held 3,557 prisoners under sentence of 
death (all for committing murder), but only 71 were executed. In 1954 147 prisoners were under 
sentence of death, and 81 were executed. Many condemned inmates today are more likely to die 
of old age than lethal injection. Of the 6,912 people under sentence of death between 1977 and 
2002 only 12% were executed.[9] A 2003 Clemson University study by Professor Joanna 
Shepherd concluded: If criminals prefer lengthy death row waits to short ones, as their numerous 
appeals and requests for stays suggest, then shortening the time until execution could increase 
the death penalty’s deterrent impact I find that shorter waits on death row increase deterrence. 
Specifically, one extra murder is deterred for every 2.75-years reduction in the death row wait 
before each execution.[10] People behave economically by weighing cost and benefit. Incentive 
is a human behavior that cannot be overlooked when it comes to deterrence. The death penalty 
saves innocent lives when it is properly administered, making it a worthy punishment.  
 
States that have the death penalty must provide extraordinary safeguards to ensure guilt. Once 
guilt has been established and appeals are exhausted, justice should be swift. The families of the 
victims deserve nothing less. The Pro-Death Penalty.com website offers a startling statistic: The 
518 killers who were executed between 1998 and 2003 had murdered at least 1111 people. That 
is an average of 2.14 victims per executed killer. The people on death row made disastrous 
decisions while members of society. The next decision these killers should make is choosing 
menu items for a final meal.  
 
**Author's Note: This revised article originally posted on this site May 8, 2003.  
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